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Abstract and Key Terms 
Pretoria’s foreign policy has undergone evolution since the advent of democracy as the 
ANC government has moved to take its place in the international relations arena. This 
evolution has seen South Africa establish itself as a significant role player in peace 
diplomacy in the African continent.  
 
From the time Pretoria started engaging in peace diplomacy, its efforts have met many 
challenges. For instance, in the 1990s, the democratic government created enemies in 
the continent after Pretoria publicly criticised the Nigerian government for executing the 
Ogoni activists, who included writer Ken Saro-Wiwa. As a result after 1999, Pretoria 
emphasised respecting other African nations’ sovereignty. South Africa resolved that it 
would engage in conflict resolution when invited by its counterparts. Through the launch 
of the African Renaissance, a continent’s renewal programme, South Africa has 
engaged in peace diplomacy through multilateralism. This way Pretoria has managed to 
achieve its goal of promoting Africa’s development on the one hand and on the other 
hand avoid to be seen as meddling in other African nations’ domestic affairs. 
 
Pretoria has also received praise for its peace diplomacy in countries such as Burundi 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). And many observers attribute South 
Africa’s success in peace mediation to the role Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and 
Jacob Zuma have played as principal foreign policy actors during their presidencies. 
 
While many foreign policy observers claim that Pretoria’s foreign policy was rooted in 
the idealistic approach during Mandela’s presidency, Mbeki’s was based on realistic 
approach and Jacob Zuma has followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, this is not 
entirely true. There is evidence that classifying Pretoria’s foreign policy as such is a 
simplistic understanding of the country’s international relations. Many observers also 
contend that while the post-apartheid government continues to make its mark as a 
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ANC – African National Congress 
APRM – African Peer Review Mechanism 
AU – African Union 
AU PSC – AU Peace and Security Council  
Codesa – Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo 
Ecowas – Economic Community of West African States  
EU – European Union 
GPA – Global Political Agreement 
ICD – Inter-Congolese Dialogue  
ICGLR – International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
M23 – 23 March Movement 
MDC – Movement for Democratic Change  
UN – United Nations 
SADC – Southern African Development Community  
SANDF – South African National Defence Force 
IRIN – Integrated Regional Information Network 
UNSC – UN Security Council  
Nato – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
Nepad – New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
OAU – Organisation of African Unity  
PFNL – Paliphehutu-FNL 
UK – United Kingdom 
USA – United States of America 
WWI – World War I 
WW II – World War II 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
When the democratic government came to power in South Africa, it realised that 
international relations had to change from what it had been during apartheid. Pretoria 
had not enjoyed harmonious relations with its neighbours during the white minority rule. 
Although successive white minority governments had terrorised the region, it was PW 
Botha’s regime that displayed the threat more openly than others. Hostilities took place 
when Botha’s government was introducing reforms. Pretoria claimed that the reign of 
terror it unleashed against its neighbours was aimed at fighting communism in southern 
Africa (Matheba, 2003). 
 
After the turmoil that South Africa had experienced up to the 1994 elections, it was time 
not for only to rebuild the country but also to normalise its relations with the rest of the 
world. Pretoria’s start was the realisation that South Africa was intricately linked to the 
well-being of the African continent. The country’s prosperity depended on the promotion 
of regional and continental economic and political co-operation which would be 
guaranteed by peace and stability (Fakir, 2007). 
 
So, as early as in the 1990s, Pretoria knew that for the new democracy to thrive, it had 
to contribute towards the attainment of peace and stability in Africa (Nibishaka, 2011), 
(Tjemolane, 2011) and (Landsberg & Khondlo, 2013). While the apartheid state had 
been aligned with the West, post-1994 Pretoria pledged to become Africa-centred and 
sought to closely co-operate with its neighbours (Southall, 2006). 
 
Some writers assert that one of the reasons the post-apartheid government sought to 
build and strengthen ties with Africa is that it felt indebted to African countries because 
of their contribution in South Africa’s liberation struggle (Boshoff, Vrey, & Rautenback, 
2010), (Graham, 2006) and (Games, 2013). After all, many African nations had played a 






After South Africa’s peaceful political transition, which Vickers calls a cause for célèbre, 
the international community was convinced that the democratic government would lead 
Africa’s economic and political renewal (Vickers, 2002). Matlosa and Hamill state that 
South Africa “was anticipated to spearhead peacekeeping interventions and mediations, 
particularly in the southern African region, because of its military (army, air-force and 
navy) power, resourcefulness and better organisation” (cited in Tjemolane, 2011). 
 
Supporting peace, stability, democracy and economic development were outlined as the 
foundation of South Africa’s foreign policy and mirrored a broader goal of charting a new 
path for African development (Beresford, 2013). Pretoria pronounced that its foreign 
policy would be value-centred and ethical in principle. It expressed commitment to 
contribute to conflict prevention, peace and security and the promotion of economic 
development (Tjemolane, Neethling , & Schoeman, 2012). 
 
Pretoria’s peace diplomacy is rooted in the international relations objectives of the 
governing ANC. In its policy document, Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic 
South Africa, the ANC outlines Pretoria’s relations with the rest of the world. It mirrors its 
long relationship with the international community. Even before the ANC government 
took office, it had formed strong relations not only with the African nations but the many 
nations around the world which helped fight white minority domination (ANC, 2012). The 
document shows how South Africa over the years has nurtured strong bonds with 
nations such as Sri Lanka, Haiti, the DRC, Somalia, Cuba, Palestine and many others. 
It also details how South Africa has committed itself to engage in the advancement of 
the African continent, economically, politically and socially (ANC, 2012).  
 
South Africa realised early that Africa’s socio-economic renewal depended on the ability 
of continent’s nations to put their hands on the plough, so as to change the continent’s 
fortunes. This would ensure that South Africa plays its part as a responsible global 






However, from 1994, the new democratic government was careful about overtly leading 
peace diplomacy in Africa. It felt that seeking that role would cause political backlash if 
not complete resistance. After all, from the time when the country embarked on forging 
ties with the rest of Africa, South Africa had faced suspicion from its counterparts in the 
continent (Alden & Le Pere, 2006), (Barber, 2005) and (Marthoz, 2012).  
 
Pretoria adopted a position of partnership, in a bid to reassure its neighbours of its 
constructive intentions. It announced that it sought to be a peaceful and reliable partner, 
no longer determined to seek its interests at their expense (Landsberg, 2012a). Pretoria 
claimed that it was an equal partner among African nations, which needed to learn from 
its counterparts (Barber, 2005). That is why South Africa said it aimed to use its 
comparative strength to benefit all and not to dominate its African counterparts 
(Landsberg & Khondlo, 2013). And the idea of South Africa being a partner to African 
nations had become conspicuous during the political transition in the 1990s (Molefi, 
2003). 
 
True to the pledges Pretoria made just before 1994, conflict resolution and 
peacekeeping have gained an important place in South Africa’s foreign policy agenda. 
Pretoria’s peace diplomacy is also rooted in the principles of its foreign policy, which is 
committed to international peace and resolution of conflicts (Dirco, 2010). Pretoria has 
carved a role as a potential peace multiplier as numerous involvements in peacemaking 
in many conflict hotspots in the continent show (Liebenberg & Mokoena, 2014).  
 
1.2 Defining the Research Problem and Hypothesis 
Puth breaks the research problem into two levels. The first level involves the detection 
of the problem while the second includes the tweaking of the problem to a stage where 
it can be undoubtedly formulated, so that it guides the research course. These levels 






success of a research project depends on a well-defined research problem and 
appropriately demarcated research objectives (cited in Strydom, 2001). 
 
Judging from the relations apartheid South Africa had with the continent, the democratic 
South Africa knew that it would work hard to thrust itself among African nations as a 
peacemaker and convince Africa that its foreign relations agenda was constructive 
compared with that of the white minority government. 
 
However, as much as South Africa has made an impact on peace diplomacy in recent 
years (Dunderdale, 2013), other African nations still view Pretoria’s leadership and 
aspirations with scepticism (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). This happens in spite of the fact 
that Africa has high expectation that South Africa must contribute to peace diplomacy in 
the region. Wheeler confirms this as he points out that African nations “are ambivalent 
towards Pretoria, expecting help but also rejecting any ‘meddling’ in their internal affairs” 
(cited in Marthoz, 2012). Other countries, such as Angola or Nigeria, resent Pretoria’s 
leadership drive (Marthoz, 2012).  
 
Leys agrees as the author states that even though Pretoria has often emphasised that it 
had no ambition to become a manipulative hegemon, its interventions in the continent 
were still inhibited by the fears of its neighbours (Leys, 2008). Lucey concurs as the 
author states: “Expectations about what Pretoria should do are often clashing. On the 
one hand, it is expected to play a major role in driving the peace and security agenda in 
Africa; yet it has been accused of hegemony” (Lucey, 2014). Hengari maintains that 
South Africa is regarded as a country with indispensable diplomatic capacity to uplift the 
continent to the international stage (Hengari, 2014). 
 
That is why Pretoria was reluctant to use its military in Africa in the early years of the 
democratic government. It was during Mbeki’s government that South Africa 
increasingly engaged its military on the continent to secure stability in war-torn Africa 






“This is not only a reflection of Mbeki’s own African and pan-Africanist leanings, but also 
of South Africa’s growing confidence in engaging with the continent, given the legacy of 
the apartheid regime and the role of the erstwhile South African Defence Force in 
southern Africa” (Sidiropoulos, 2007). 
 
After 20 years of democracy, Pretoria has won praise and also faced criticism for its 
peace diplomacy and that is why its conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa 
continues to be a subject of intense debate. In view of the democratic government’s 
engagement in peace diplomacy in Africa since 1994, this study investigates the 
efficacy of Pretoria’s conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the continent. It aims to 
probe whether South Africa has learnt from its mistakes over the years and, therefore, 
has become a confident peacemaker. This research is guided by the assumption that 
while the South African foreign policy is said to have been dogged by inconsistency 
since the dawn of democracy, Pretoria has made a significant contribution to Africa’s 
peace diplomacy. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
When the democratic government took office, it sought to formulate a people-centred 
foreign policy that would reflect the rich history of their international heritage (Institute 
for Global Dialogue, 2012). This research will discuss Pretoria’s relations with the rest of 
the continent. 
 
Landsberg notes that there is popular belief that foreign policies of Mandela and Mbeki 
were characterised by continuity but Pretoria’s foreign policy has changed since Zuma 
took office (Landsberg, 2012b). This study will seek to show the influence of Mandela, 
Mbeki and Zuma in peace diplomacy. This research will exclude a discussion on 
Kgalema Motlanthe because his presidency lasted several months between 2008 and 
2009. The other presidents have spent enough time in office for a researcher to be able 






The hostility with which the white minority government treated its neighbour had a huge 
influence on how Pretoria decided to conduct its peace diplomacy with the rest of the 
continent after 1994. This research will briefly explore Pretoria’s foreign policy before 
1994, so as to show why it had an impact on the behaviour of foreign policy actors after 
1994. It will also discuss changes in foreign policy of post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
1.4 Key Questions to be Asked 
Defining research questions is critical in driving the research process and is the basis of 
any research method. It is also one of the first requirements made in any study because 
it points out the trajectory of the study (Shuttleworth, 2008). 
 
The protection of human rights was high in South Africa’s foreign policy agenda in the 
early years of the democratic government (Jordaan, 2010). And this became one of the 
motivations that caused Pretoria to become involved in peace diplomacy in the 
continent (ANC, 2007). This study set out to answer these primary questions: How has 
South Africa fared in its peace diplomacy efforts in Africa? How have Mandela, Mbeki 
and Zuma influenced South Africa’s conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the 
continent? 
 
Secondary questions are: What have been changes in South Africa’s foreign policy 
since 1994? How did Pretoria’s behaviour before 1994 affect the way post-apartheid 
policymakers have responded to peace diplomacy after 1994? How have South Africa’s 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts been received by other African nations? 
What challenges has Pretoria’s peace diplomacy faced since 1994? 
 
South Africa chose to engage in foreign relations through working within a multilateral 
environment so as to promote Africa’s renewal (Mabuda, 2008). That is why Pretoria 
mainly engages in conflict resolution and peacekeeping working under the mandates of 






African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), among others. This study will not provide an 
in-depth analysis of Pretoria’s working through these organisations. However, it will give 
an outline of South Africa’s contribution in these organisations.  
 
1.5 Justification of the Study 
While many scholars have analysed post-apartheid peace diplomacy, the subject is still 
a fertile research ground. This study investigates Pretoria’s peace diplomacy after 1994, 
especially, in the African continent. The prevalence of conflicts in the continent has long 
been a concern to the international community. According to Southall, the reason for 
this is that Africa’s conflicts, whether triggered by the Cold War or other local issues, 
have been problematic and devastating to any prospects for human development 
(Southall, 2006). So, it comes as no surprise that South Africa has been eager to 
contribute to bringing peace in Africa.  
 
Stols states that while Mandela’s presidency focused on taking South Africa through the 
transition phase, Mbeki guided the thriving democracy to play its part as an international 
relations actor (cited in Graham, 2004). South Africa’s moral authority and willingness to 
play an active role in the world gave it a unique leverage with both the North and the 
South and positioned Pretoria as the champion of Africa’s developmental agenda 
(Sidiropoulos, 2014). 
 
Bowland argues, though, that while the democratic government has succeeded in 
articulating South Africa’s foreign policy in its official documents, in practice its 
implementation has been more intricate and at times difficult to read (Bowland, 2013). 
 
Several post-graduate researchers have also contributed to the debate on Pretoria’s 
foreign policy (in their master’s theses). In his research titled, Promotion of liberal values 







Mkalipi (2002) investigates the ambiguous nature of Pretoria’s foreign policy. Machesa 
(1997) probes the transition of the foreign policy approaches of the ANC from 1989 to 
1994, in his work titled, The African National Congress’ foreign policy in transition: 
change or continuity?  
 
In his study titled, Assessing South Africa’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe: 
strengths and weaknesses, Mkhize (2008) tackles Pretoria’s peace diplomacy in 
Zimbabwe. In the thesis, South Africa’s role in Africa: the evolution of post-apartheid 
foreign policy, Kooiman (2010) investigates the distinction between South Africa under 
Mandela and the period of Mbeki’s leadership. 
 
Studies mentioned above only probe aspects of South Africa’s peace diplomacy; they 
fall short in offering the full picture of Pretoria’s peace diplomacy since the democratic 
government took office. Thus this study aims to address this gap by offering a holistic 
analysis of South Africa’s peace diplomacy from 1994 to 2014. It aims to examine 
successes and failures of Pretoria’s peace diplomatic engagements and offer 
recommendations based on lessons learnt from South Africa’s experience. This 
research will also show the evolution of Pretoria’s peace diplomacy since the advent of 
democracy and how it continues to change Africa’s peace diplomacy. It also aims to 
contribute to the existing literature on South Africa’s role as a peace mediator in the 
continent.  
 
1.6 Limitations of the Study 
American academics R Snyder, H Bruck and B Sapin lament the lack of access to 
information for researchers, as they say: “…data are notoriously hard to come by 
because governments are prone to suppress many things which the scholar must know 
and wants to know” (cited in Siko, 2014). The main limitation for this study is that not all 
information on Pretoria’s peace diplomacy is available to the public because some of 






they are available in the internet. Because of time constraints, this research will exclude 
interviews. A study allocated more resources will strengthen this research project. 
 
1.7 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 1 – Background, Objectives and Research Questions 
The first chapter introduces the historical background of South Africa’s foreign relations 
before the democratic dispensation. It also discusses how Pretoria committed to 
contribute to peace diplomacy in the continent after 1994. It identifies the context within 
which the research will be conducted, states the research questions which direct the 
study throughout the remainder of the research and discusses the objectives and 
limitations of this work. 
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
This chapter surveys literature on the South African foreign policy. It also examines the 
various conclusions that foreign policy observers have drawn in their attempt to analyse 
South Africa’s foreign policy in the area of peace diplomacy. This section also examines 
Pretoria’s relations with the rest of the continent, especially after 1994 and how South 
Africans relate to Pretoria’s foreign policy. 
 
Chapter 3– Research Methodology 
This section discusses the methodology used to investigate this study which is 
qualitative research that is explanatory and descriptive. It also discusses theories of 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution, idealism and realism. It intends to furnish the 
reader with the conceptual tools for elucidating the nature of Pretoria’s foreign policy. 
 
Chapter 4 –Research results 
This chapter outlines the white minority government’s foreign relations with the 
continent. It also explores how Pretoria has used multilateralism to contribute to 
promotion of peace in the continent. Last, this chapter analyses Pretoria’s peace 





Chapter 5 – Analysis of Results 
This part of the study analyses foreign policy under the presidencies of Mandela, Mbeki 
and Zuma. It shows how the three heads of state have helped Pretoria contribute to 
bringing peace in the continent. It also discusses the changes that have taken place in 
Pretoria’s foreign policy in the past 20 years and the challenges that Pretoria’s peace 
diplomacy still faces. At the end, this chapter discusses the theoretical analysis which 
guides this study.  
 
Chapter 6 – Summary and Recommendations 
The section summarises the thesis, including the findings obtained in the study. This 









A literature review is an evaluative discussion of research found in the literature on a 
selected topic. The purpose of the literature review, among other things, is to present a 
background for the study, prove that the research has not been conducted and show 
that the research is contributing to the body of knowledge of the field (Boote & Beile, 
2005). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present literature on the South African foreign policy with 
an emphasis on peace diplomacy. The chapter begins with discussing the concepts of 
conflict resolution, peacekeeping, foreign policy and peacemaking. These concepts are 
important because while foreign relations has many branches such as economic 
relations, diplomatic co-operations, among others, this study investigates Pretoria’s 
peace diplomacy. This section then discusses South Africa’s relations with the continent 
and ordinary South Africans’ views on the country’s foreign policy.  
 
2.2 When is the Literature Review Conducted? 
Polit and Hunger argue that qualitative review can be done either before or after data 
collection. Researchers who believe the review should be conducted before data 
collection say doing the literature review first justifies the research, puts it into 
perspective and familiarises the researcher with the subject investigated. But 
researchers who believe the review should be conducted after data collection say that 
saves the researcher from being influenced by pre-conceived thoughts on the topic 
(cited in Mamabolo, 2006).  
 
In this study, the researcher did the literature study before submitting the proposal. The 






under investigation. The literature study was also aimed at orientating the researcher 
with the writings on the subject probed. The literature review informed the researcher 
about the relevant content of the literature. Because of that fact, this research can  
be correlated to the available knowledge in the literature on the phenomenon 
investigated. 
 
2.3 Conceptual Clarification 
(a) Foreign Policy 
A foreign policy “is an activity of a state with which it fulfils its aims and interests within 
the international arena”. The intention of a country’s foreign policy is to influence the 
international arena with the aim of fulfilling the objectives of its foreign relations agenda 
(Petrič, 2013). Governments develop foreign policy agenda so that they can influence 
the behaviour of other nations in areas such as military, political and trade co-operation 
(Russett, Starr, & Kinsella, 2006).  
 
Naidoo further states that foreign policy “is the art of building, for the long term, the 
careful nurturing of relationships, the elaboration of policies that enhance available 
options while constraining those of potential opponents” (Naidoo, 2010).  
 
Foreign policy is not aimed at the manipulation of other states, but it is an agenda with 
which a state persuades others to behave in a manner that is desirable to its national 
interests. In fact, the domestic environment shapes the country’s foreign policy and 
mirrors the ideology and national interests (Naidoo, 2010). In support of this, Russett, 
Starr and Kinsella posit that a state pursues foreign policy objectives on behalf of the 
nation (Russett, Starr, & Kinsella, 2006).  
 
Selebi (then-Foreign Affairs director-general) concurs as he says that foreign policy is 






Williams, 2000), while Kissinger says foreign policy starts where domestic policy ends 
(cited in Landsberg, 2008). Hughes acquiesces as he states that it is conventionally 
held by foreign policy theorists that foreign policy broadly reflects the predominant 
interest of the domestic polity (Olivier, 2006). 
 
However, there is debate whether the government always acts on the mandate of the 
electorate or politicians decide for the nation what will be of national interest (Russett, 
Starr, & Kinsella, 2006). 
 
A country’s foreign policy develops over time as a result of reviews on a country’s 
interests. In essence as much as the foreign policy is determined by the domestic 
environment, it also responds to trends that affect the economy and other issues 
happening in the international arena (Dietrichsen, 1994). Foreign policies are aimed at 
increasing interests and values beyond nations’ borders. These policies differ in 
diplomatic strategies nations use to achieve their goals (Olivier, 2006).  
 
(b) Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution is the process of stopping a conflict with a result that, in the eyes of 
parties involved, brings about a permanent solution to a problem. Conflict resolution 
makes a solution possible because it deals with the root of the problem. Conflict 
resolution brings warring parties to a settlement that resolves their main dissatisfaction, 
acknowledges each party’s existence and stops all hostilities among those in involved in 
conflict (Wallensteen, 2002). 
 
Burton and Onumajuru further note that conflict resolution is a problem-solving process 
which addresses individual and group needs such as identity and recognition and 







Kelman sums up conflict resolution as a change of relationship between parties 
concerned with moving towards reconciliation (Kelman, 2010). The author asserts that 
conflict resolution results in a deal that is reached interactively, rather than imposed or 
sponsored by outside powers, and to which the parties fully commit. However, in a case 
where warring parties seem to ignore calls to stop the fighting, peace-enforcement 
becomes an answer. That involves direct combat and use of the army to force peace 
where parties in conflict refuse to agree to a ceasefire (Brooks, 1999). 
 
Conflict resolution addresses the parties’ basic needs and fears and, therefore, ensuring 
a permanent solution. After all, these are the issues that trigger the conflict. Conflict 
resolution builds reasonable trust between the parties – a trust in other party’s interest 
in achieving and maintaining peace – and, therefore, free from monitoring as the 
guarantor of the agreement. It forms a new relationship between the parties, where 
each group respects each other’s needs and limitations. This, in other words, brings 
parties to the understanding of each other’s points of dissatisfaction which caused the 
conflict in the first place. Conflict resolution also generates public support for the 
agreement and encourages the development of new images of the parties involved in 
the dispute (Kelman, 2010). 
 
(c) Peacekeeping 
Fetherston and Crichton bemoan the lack of theory on the subject of peacekeeping, 
whose research comes mostly from diplomats and military staff (Fetherston, 2000) and 
(Crichton, 2009). Fetherston says: “In essence, we are still largely in the dark in terms of 
improving analysis, effectiveness and success of peacekeeping” (Fetherston, 2000). 
 
Crichton blames the difficulty to theorise peacekeeping on its considerable evolvement 
over the past 60 years and the use of the term to describe a wide range of activities. 
The evidence of this is the fact that the term peacekeeping has no fixed meaning 
(Crichton, 2009). At best peacekeeping is a tool of peacemaking which aims to build 





The primary goal of peacekeeping is to stop an armed conflict or prevent it from  
re-igniting. This is achieved by making peacekeepers a physical barrier between 
warring parties and observing their military actions. The secondary goal of 
peacekeeping is to create a peaceful environment for talks aimed at resolving the 
underlying conflict (Diehl, 1988).  
 
The International Peace Academy defines peacekeeping as the prevention, 
containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through 
the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organised and directed internationally 
using multinational force of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace 
(cited in Diehl, 1988). On the other hand, Fortna and Howard state that peacekeeping 
refers to the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security 
(Fortna & Howard, 2008). 
 
An ideal outcome of peacekeeping would be to attempt to resolve the conflict without 
bloodshed. Peacekeeping also enables warring parties “to cool off” without fear that 
they will be attacked. This leads to talks aimed at dealing with the root of the dispute 
with the aim of finding a solution which will be embraced by all parties (Diehl, 1988). 
 
Shaw posits that peacekeeping takes place after a ceasefire has been declared and 
major warring parties show willingness to accept help from a third party in upholding a 
shaky peace agreement. Peacekeeping operations should be undertaken without 
prejudice to any party to the original conflict. They must be undertaken only with the 
consent of the parties concerned. Armed peacekeepers’ weapons must be fired only in 
self-defence or the protection of the innocent (Shaw, 1994).  
 
(d) Peacemaking 
Peacemaking usually involves processes that address violence, generally, including 






measures as stipulated in Charter VI of the United Nations. Peacemakers may include 
envoys, governments, regional organisations, prominent personalities, non-
governmental organisations or the United Nations (United Nations, undated b). The 
process of peacemaking should happen with the consent of the warring parties (Robert 
F Kennedy Centre, undated).  
The post-apartheid government has been involved in peacemaking in the African 
continent since it came to power in 1994. Reasons for this include its economic power 
and military resources, which give it the capability and influence to lead in this area 
(Nathan, 2013). These strengths are what have equipped South Africa to be a 
formidable peacemaker in the continent (Tonheim & Swart, 2015).  
Peacemaking takes place in situations where conflict is intense but there are possible 
conditions to bring peace. It is the process of maintaining peace to the ceasefire 
situation for which the warring factions are rewarded with incentives and are punished 
with sanctions if they fail to adhere to deals or decisions reached. Basically, the main 
difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking is that the former does not 
normally involve the use of force while the latter includes the threat and actual use of 
force to stop conflicts (Chigozie & Ituma, 2015). As mentioned above, armed 
peacekeepers’ weapons must be fired only in self-defence or the protection of the 
innocent (Shaw, 1994). 
The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) sums up three processes of 
peace diplomacy. It states that in conflict resolution interventions, peacekeeping 
becomes a temporary exercise initiated to stop a volatile situation and decrease 
enablers of a violent conflict between warring parties. Peacemaking includes all conflict 
resolution and mediation techniques aimed at bringing the warring parties to a 
settlement, while peace enforcement includes methods to force a rebellious party to 






2.4 Nature of South Africa’s Foreign Policy 
In conducting this study, several sources have been analysed. A common accusation 
that is conspicuous in writings on the South African foreign policy is that although 
Pretoria has made a mark in peace diplomacy since the birth of democracy, it still lacks 
direction and that weakness has led to contradictory implementation of the policy, 
(Nathan, 2005), (Ryall, 1997), (Hamill & Lee, 2001), (Spector, 2013), (Thipanyane, 
2011), (Henwood, 1997), (Cilliers, 1999), (Dudley, 2013), (Bischoff, 2003), (Wagner & 
McLaughlin, 2013) and (Alden & Le Pere, 2004).  
 
Wheeler notes, “it has no substance” and Mills concludes that, “it’s a bit of this and a bit 
of that” (cited in Leon, 2012). Schoeman and Alden point out that one of the 
inconsistencies Pretoria has shown is its support of quiet diplomacy in response to state 
violence in Zimbabwe (cited in Nathan, 2005). 
 
In defending Pretoria’s international relations practice, Spence suggests that sometimes 
foreign policy decisions are made as issues arise. He points out that enthusiasts “who 
look for coherence in a well-structured foreign policy underestimate contingent and 
unforeseen factors and the developments and forces that lie outside the control of even 
the most skillful bureaucracy and political class” (cited in Nathan, 2005). Presidents’ 
policies also differ because their priorities and events that take place during their time in 
office require unique responses towards foreign policy issues (Marthoz, 2012). 
 
Siko, Hamill and Lee and Nathan do not agree that Pretoria’s foreign policy has always 
been contradictory since 1994 (Nathan, 2005), (Hamill and Lee, 2001) and (Siko, 2014). 
Siko states that the means by which governments take foreign relations decisions differ; 
there is no “one-size-fits-all model” (Siko, 2014). Nathan on the other hand says by 
2005, Pretoria’s foreign policy had been coherent (Nathan, 2005).  
 
But how have South Africa’s foreign policy principal actors responded to peace 






observers have debated Pretoria’s international relations, literature search (Hamill and 
Lee, 2001), (Youla, 2009), (Habib and Selinyane, 2006), (Naidoo, 2010), (Spence, 
2001), (Olivier, 2006), (Mkhize, 2008), (Ryall, 1997), (Tjemolane, 2011), reveals that 
Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma have influenced peace diplomacy substantially since the 
advent to democracy in 1994. Although there is continuity from Mandela to Mbeki and 
Zuma, each president has imposed his signature, principles and style on foreign policy 
(Marthoz, 2012). 
 
Mandela’s presidency was based on peacebuilding and promoting human rights, 
Mbeki’s continued with peacebuilding but also focused on wealth creation and peace 
diplomacy and Zuma’s reveals no change from Mbeki’s focus (Manganyi, 2014). 
Mandela’s government firmly imprinted Pretoria’s moral authority on the world. His 
successor became known as an African visionary. Under Mbeki, Africa began to gain 
prominence as he promoted many reforms on the continent. His term is credited with 
illuminating a vision of African leadership. But under Zuma, although there is continuity, 
there is vagueness about what the South African foreign policy is, because it lacks 
strategic direction and as such, it is difficult to predict (Lalbahadur, 2014).  
 
On the other hand, Sidiropoulos describes Mandela’s presidency (from 1994 to 1999) 
as a honeymoon phase. The author states that at that time South Africa’s moral 
authority was high, with the human rights agenda dominating. Mbeki’s presidency 
(1999-2008) was dominated by the African Renaissance where he promoted the African 
Agenda (Sidiropoulos, 2014).  
 
Mandela accentuated the importance of Africa to Pretoria’s foreign policy in the post-
apartheid era. He sought to promote greater regional co-operation to support the 
continent’s economic development. Mbeki also prioritised economic regeneration as a 
basis of Africa’s development and promoted the revamping of the regional organisations 
so as to boost the continent’s political and economic influence. Zuma has continued 






economic interests as part of the broader development of Africa. The transition from 
Mbeki to Zuma was also a change from one leader who was regarded as a foreign 
policy president to one whose agenda is in gestation (Pillay, 2011). 
 
2.5 South Africa’s Position in the Continent 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, from the outset, South Africa made it clear that Africa would 
be high on its foreign policy agenda because the post-apartheid government was 
naturally connected to the continent (Accord, 2014), (Hendricks & Lucey, 2013), (Nzo 
cited in Tjemolane, 2011), (Gigaba, 2013), (Blumenfeld, 2010) and (Lalbahadur, 2014). 
The democratic government showed a desire to make Africa, particularly southern 
Africa, a theatre of South African activism (Alden & Le Pere, 2006). And, it is this desire 
that birthed Pretoria’s African Agenda (Accord, 2014). 
 
However, Fakir has reservations about Pretoria’s concept of the African Agenda. He 
argues that while the definition of the African Agenda appears vague at best and 
abstract at worst, its application in public communication by policy actors in South Africa 
usually avoids addressing these conceptual and definitional problems (Fakir, 2007).  
 
At one level, the African Agenda seems to symbolise general debates on processes to 
promote African democracy and governance and the challenges that these face. At 
another level, it seems to reflect Pretoria’s own major challenges as the country seeks 
to play a leading role and advance its own strategic interests in the continent. Therefore, 
South Africa’s African Agenda serves a critical role of advancing Pretoria’s continental 
leadership role and that is seen in its participation in various programmes on the 
continent (Fakir, 2007). 
 
Pretoria’s defence policy had prevented the country from taking a bigger role in African 
peacekeeping. That is why, in the early years of democracy, Mbeki was not enthusiastic 






Regional Information Network) notes that Mandela’s successor was against a more 
active peacekeeping role in the continent. He loathed peacekeeping, seeing it as 
intervention (IRIN, 2012). IRIN quotes an expert as saying Mbeki preferred dialogue 
(cited in IRIN, 2012).  
 
Sidiropoulos concurs as she points out that the democratic government’s second 
president was sensitive to criticism that South Africa acted as a bully or hegemon in the 
continent (Sidiropoulos, 2008). 
 
Mbeki preferred persuasion, and talks that he could lead, as compared with the use of 
confrontation. Mediation and facilitation of negotiation became a form of continuous and 
energetic engagement, in the continent (Nathan, 2005). However, Landsberg points out 
that over time, Mbeki’s administration made a significant contribution towards promoting 
peace diplomacy. He rejects claims made by many commentators that Mbeki’s 
government sought a hegemonic role in the continent (Landsberg, 2012b). 
 
South Africa believed that non-confrontational conflict resolution was the most effective 
technique for achieving lasting peace in situations of civil war and other crises on the 
continent. This could be accomplished when South Africa resisted ambitions of being 
regional power or hegemon (Sidiropoulos, 2008). However, Sidiropoulos opines that 
Africa needs a hegemon/s which will lead and help establish stability among 
neighbouring states (Sidiropoulos, 2008). 
 
As early as Mandela’s presidency, Pretoria discovered that peace diplomacy would not 
be smooth sailing. Two of some of the cases for which it was lambasted included 
Mandela’s attempt to mediate in Nigeria in 1995 and Pretoria’s military intervention in 
Lesotho in 1998. One interesting development about the intervention in Lesotho is that 
while South Africa was blamed for interfering in another sovereign country’s domestic 







Pretoria had acted on the SADC mandate to restore peace in the mountain kingdom 
(Neethling, 1999). “The intervention (which was requested by Prime Minister of Lesotho, 
Pakalitha Mosisili) was based on agreements reached in SADC after all attempts at 
peacefully resolving the dispute had failed” (Neethling, 1999). 
 
Mandela’s Nigeria mediation fiasco is one of the efforts that changed the way South 
Africa has pursued African partnerships on peace diplomacy (Van Nieuwkerk, 2013). 
Pretoria learned that unilateralism would not win it many friends in the continent. Instead 
it risked being labelled a bully, which the apartheid government was notoriously known 
for. That is why in its ambition to lead peace diplomacy in the continent, Pretoria has 
promoted multilateralism based on African solidarity, partnerships and regional co-
operation and tried to project an image of a “gentle giant” rather than a “big brother” 
(Institute for Security Studies, 2004). That has led Ryall to conclude that South Africa is 
not an African Tiger. The author suggests that observers who think it is, see the young 
democracy separate from the continent (Ryall, 1997). 
 
However, Hamill argues that although the case for South African leadership is a 
convincing one, those leadership ambitions are still not received well at home, nor are 
they always welcomed in the continent. This results in a complicated, even dangerous 
policymaking setting, worsened by Pretoria’s strategic vision (Hamill, 2013). 
 
2.6 South African Citizens and the Foreign Policy 
While it is argued that foreign policy extensive public participation is not possible, 
Headley and Van Wyk believe that cynicism against public participation has no logic 
(Headley & Van Wyk, 2012).  
 
Exclusion in policy making disempowers citizens in the seemingly foreseeable forces of 
globalisation and adds to their lack of interest towards foreign policy (Nel & Van Wyk, 






wishes “saving citizens from themselves” in a bid to defend national interest. Benjamin 
and Barabas suggest that ordinary citizens are uninterested, inattentive and reluctant to 
get involved in foreign relations (Benjamin & Barabas, 2000). 
 
But Hudson also points out that the democratic government has an ethical responsibility 
to serve domestic interests first. Pretoria’s foreign policy should cater for the interest of 
its citizens before looking at the affairs of others. That is why Hudson states that the life 
and death of an ethical foreign policy depends on whether the people participate in 
foreign policy making. “It is necessary to remember that foreign policies advance certain 
domestic interests at the expense of others. The critical question to ask is how does this 
affect the citizens of that country? More concretely, what is the link between South 
Africa’s peacekeeping involvement and domestic interests?” (Hudson, 2010). 
 
But how is Pretoria’s response to public participation in foreign relation viewed in the 
country? South Africa’s approach in foreign relations is that of guardianship (Pfister, 
2004). That means Pretoria acts on what it sees as the interest of the people, rather 
than what people say they are interested in. Headley and Van Wyk rightly associate that 
thinking with realism theory. Realists believe that the public should not be involved in 
foreign policy because they are ignorant or they don’t care. Foreign relations is a sphere 
that is understood by experts, the writers quote theorist Morgenthau as saying (Headley 
& Van Wyk, 2012). 
 
Pretoria has fallen short in the duty to communicate the South African strategic bent 
when engaging in foreign relations, particularly in the continent (Lalbahadur, 2014), 
although when the ANC government came to power, in many of its documents, the 
governing party declared that South Africa’s foreign policy was for the people (ANC, 
1993).  
 
The South African government has always seen its foreign policy as people-centred, a 






the fact that South Africans have been largely left out in the formulation of the country’s 
foreign policy (Van Wyk, 2012).  
 
Vale and Taylor share the same sentiment as they state that discussions of Pretoria’s 
foreign policy lack any link with the population. This behaviour ignores the fact that 
international relations engagements will eventually affect the ordinary people (Vale & 
Taylor, 1999). However, Matshiqi argues that nowhere in the world are citizens informed 
about every matter of the state. Having said that, the analyst also suggests that Pretoria 
can improve its public diplomacy (Matshiqi, 2013).  
 
But, it seems that most South Africans believe that Pretoria should play an active role in 
foreign relations. In a study published in 2013, South Africans say they support Pretoria 
playing a part in Africa as long as foreign policy actors do not undermine domestic 
priorities. In this study, the promotion of human rights, which Mandela referred to as “the 
guiding light of South Africa’s foreign policy”, take a backseat. Fifty percent of South 
Africans agree that trade should not be hampered by promotion of human rights (Smith 
& Van der Westhuizen, 2013).  
 
In fact, integrating South Africa’s foreign policy with domestic policies and capabilities 
was one of the goals of the search for a post-Mandela approach to international 
relations (Alden and Le Pere, 2006). The reason Zuma’s government changed the 
name of the Foreign Relations Department to Department of International Relations &  
Co-operation was that Pretoria wanted to close the gap between citizens and foreign 
affairs. Landsberg quotes the Minister of Department of International Relations & Co-
operation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, as saying: “One of the important areas of our 
work will be to make South Africans aware of the work that the department is doing” 
(Landsberg, 2012a).  
 
Siko also agrees that public participation in foreign policy did not increase after the 






the failure of the outside actors to use the political space availed by the post-apartheid 
government. The author points out that it is only the academia who have attempted to 
influence Pretoria’s foreign policy during the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki with 
mixed results (Siko, 2014). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Before examining existing literature on Pretoria’s foreign policy, this chapter defined 
foreign policy, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacemaking. It also highlighted 
the different debates and conclusions that foreign policy observers have drawn in 
analysing South Africa’s relations with the rest of the continent, how South Africans view 
foreign relations and how accessible Pretoria’s foreign policy is to the ordinary South 
Africans.  
 
The literature has shown that Pretoria has received both criticism and praise over how it 
navigates foreign relations in the African continent. It also highlighted the nature of 
Pretoria’s foreign policy under Mandela (promoting human rights), Mbeki (promoting the 










Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces two sections of the study. The first deals with the methodology 
used to conduct this research and how it has guided data collection and analysis. It also 
introduces qualitative research which the researcher chose to investigate this study. It 
also elaborates on the background of this method and how a study such as this benefits 
from it. The rest of the section examines grounded theory, research design, data 
collection, analysis, reduction and management and document analysis, explaining why 
the researcher used all these to conduct the study. 
 
The second section of this chapter unpacks the theoretical framework which guides this 
study. International relations theories of idealism and realism are examined because 
they have been associated with post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy. Conflict 




Methodology refers to a model of how things are done (Whitehead & Mcniff, 2006). It is 
a scientifically structured approach used to test constructs. Methodology is vital in a 
research project particularly to prove the hypothesis. It can also help expand the scope 
of received theories. For example, game theory offers additional insights into strategic 
interactions between players (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2007). 
 
Theory and methodology are useful when they work together for the expansion of 
knowledge. While theory gives explanations for certain phenomena based on specific 
assumptions, purely accepted knowledge used as theories is seldom useful in 






methods of examining that ensure that there is no selection bias (Sprinz & Wolinsky-
Nahmias, 2007). 
 
Social research methodology is a practice used in research studies to reach sound 
findings. Methodology for social research includes the practical use of knowledge power 
to engage the methodological process that proves relevant to the object of study. 
Methodology, therefore, pre-supposes what systematic method of procedure is being 
used to gather and receive data relevant to the object of study (Efretuei, 2005). 
 
The methodology employed in this research is the qualitative research, with primary and 
secondary procedures. The primary sources used are mainly accounts of South African 
foreign relations actors sourced from speeches, media interviews, government 
documents and ANC documents on foreign policy. 
 
Secondary sources are relevant textbooks, scholarly journal articles, website articles, 
conference proceedings reports, media reports and monographs. In a bid to ensure 
professional quality of the data so as to enhance the study, the researcher used mostly 
peer-reviewed scholarly writings which were sourced from reputable organisations such 
as the South African Institute of Race Relations, Foreign Policy Association, Review of 
African Political Economy, South African Institute of International Affairs, Covenant 
University Journal of Politics and International Affairs, Review of African Political 
Economy, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, The Edge Institute, 
Human Sciences Research Council, International Affairs, Institute for Global Studies, 
Institute for Security Studies, among others. 
 
The key reason this research employs primary and secondary sources is that the South 
African foreign policy has been a focus of debates, interpretations, insights and studies 
which cannot fit in a quantitative inquiry because they are incalculable. The perspective 







Theorists have devised a number of research processes which take place in a number 
of stages. This denotes that a researcher needs proper planning so as to execute a 
scientifically acceptable study (Strydom, 2001).  
 
Although not all the steps are applicable to all types of research, sensitivity and 
application of relevant steps in the research process used by the researcher will 
enhance the success and quality of the research project – it will assist the researcher in 
his or her initiative to do “the right thing” in “the right way”, (Strydom 2001). 
 
Blankenship identifies eight phases of the research process. These seem not suitable 
for this study because they deal with interview-reliant research (Blankenship, 2010). 
Englen’s framework on research process includes seven steps which seem to be a 
rather over-simplification of a long and complex research (Englen, 2010) such as the 
one the researcher is investigating. 
 
Bailey’s stages of research process guide this study because they neatly fit in this type 
of research. He also moves beyond the dissertation report as being the final stage, 
through dissemination of the findings (Bailey, 1994).  
 
Using the Bailey model, the remainder of this chapter describes and explains methods 
the researcher utilised in this study. The stages are as follows: choosing the research 
problem and defining the hypothesis, drawing research questions, formulating the 
research design, gathering the data, analysing the data and interpreting the data. The 
first three stages are discussed in Chapter 1 while the remaining four are discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
3.2.1 Qualitative Research 
According to Denzin and Lincoln: “Qualitative approach is an activity that locates the 






world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a field of 
representations, including field notes, conversations, photographs, recordings, 
interviews and memos to the self. This means that qualitative researchers study things 
in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of 
the meaning people bring to them” (cited in Tavallaei & Talib, 2010). 
 
Miller also states that qualitative research is a window through which we see and form 
opinions on important social issues (Miller, 1997). This approach is good at examining 
and formulating theories that deal with the role of meaning and interpretation (Ezzy, 
2002). Qualitative research is used to evaluate a wide range of processes such as 
services, interventions and programmes. It can also be used to advance policy 
development or implementation, for example, to examine an issue or problem that is 
poorly understood or to inform the kind of intervention required. It also helps develop 
and evaluate criteria where these are unclear or where alternative criteria are sought 
(Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis, & Dillon, 2003). 
 
Qualitative researchers use different tools and procedures to develop an understanding 
of how people see their social realities and how they respond within the social world. 
They attempt to make connections between events and perceptions so that their 
analyses are rounded and have perspective (Hughes, undated). This study 
endeavoured to examine debates about the post-apartheid government’s peace 
diplomacy, especially in the continent. 
 
Hughes suggests that qualitative researchers must use key principles of research 
design such as marrying the research questions to the methodological approaches, 
seeing issues of analysis and data collection as unified and being clear about the 
purpose of the research. Qualitative researchers should choose the way they want their 
research design to pan out and be guided by the mutating context and situations in 
which the research takes place. They must be always aware of their role in the research 






The author also warns that qualitative methods should not be seen as completely 
independent from quantitative research because the two in some cases do complement 
each other. She even asserts that “the ‘divide’ between quantitative and qualitative 
research is to some extent false” (Hughes, undated). “Qualitative research does 
quantify. Quantitative research can collect more qualitative data through open-ended 
questions. All researchers should think carefully about how the choices of method and 
the potential combinations of approach are appropriate and possible” (Hughes, 
undated). Rajasekar, Philominathan and Chinnathambi also concur as they add that, in 
fact, qualitative methods can be used to understand the meaning of the numbers 
obtained by quantitative methods (Rajasekar, Philominathan, & Chinnathambi, 2013). 
 
Kus also acquiesces as he suggests that the decision to use qualitative or quantitative 
research should be based on technical matters on suitability of a particular research 
method for a particular research problem (Kus, 2003). “Both quantitative and qualitative 
researches have strong and weak points and thus (to find out) which one meets 
requirements of the research better is a technical decision. The authors who accept the 
differences between quantitative and qualitative researches as technical differences 
claim that these two techniques can be used in the same research” (Kus, 2003). 
 
The author concludes that the two approaches, in fact, are not on the opposite end of 
each other. In actual fact, researchers are not forced to choose only one of them. (Kus, 
2003). The choice of approach should depend on the type of erudition the researcher 
wants to unearth or build not on which approach he or she likes or dislike. The 
distinction is fallacious and should be avoided (Davies, 2007). 
 
While there are several types of qualitative research, the commonly used ones include 
grounded theory, phenomenology and ethnography. Grounded theory (which has been 
used to investigate the research question for this study) is a commonly utilised 
qualitative method in the social sciences to inductively formulate or discover a theory 






The process and method of qualitative research are flexible. The researcher can adapt 
the schedule as new dynamics arise during the research process (Mkhonto, 2005). The 
researcher had to change the research plan after literature revealed that one of the 
reasons the post-apartheid government was cautious about engaging in peace 
diplomacy was that the apartheid government was hostile towards Africa. The original 
plan was to exclude a discussion on apartheid government’s foreign relations because 
this study aimed to investigate Pretoria’s foreign policy after 1994.  
 
While the emphasis of qualitative research is on processes and meanings that are not 
deeply examined or measured in terms of quantity or amount, quantitative research 
measures and analyses causal relationships between variables, not processes (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 1998) and (Babbie, 1999). 
 
Whereas many researchers assume that the qualitative research is less complicated 
than quantitative approach (Lu & Shulman, 2008), this approach is, indeed, rigorous 
and has its own data collection and data analysis methods that ensure that its findings 
can be trusted (Borrego, Douglas, & Amelink, 2009). 
 
According to Tewksbury, qualitative methods of research are complex, require a greater 
emphasis on researchers clarifying and defining what things mean, and rely on the 
intellectual ability of researchers to organise, manage, analyse and interpret data 
(Tewksbury, 2009). The researcher spent a greater part of the initial stages of study 
collecting and analysing data used in this study.  
 
Many researchers opt for this approach because they see it as more manageable, 
saves time and excludes “doing the sum” and does not include statistics. It is seen as 
more human and more in line with modern social thinking (Davies, 2007). One of the 
reasons this study took the qualitative approach is that it is easy to control and would be 
completed in a fairly short time. However, the quantitative method employs the same 






the idea that its outcomes have certainty which makes it possible for conclusion to be 
made to “a specifiable probability” (Davies, 2007). 
 
Qualitative researchers tend to structure their research questions in a style that can only 
be answered through qualitative research. Such researchers are drawn to the 
developing and dynamic nature of this approach as opposed to the inflexible and 
structured format of quantitative methods. They enjoy discovery. Statistics might be 
fascinating, but it is the limitless possibilities to learn about people that qualitative 
research resonate to (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  
 
Qualitative researchers are interested in the prospect to connect with their participants 
at a human level. They have a natural inquisitiveness that leads them to learn about 
worlds that fascinate them, that they otherwise would not have access to. For the 
qualitative researchers, doing research is a challenge that brings the whole self into the 
process (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The interest to do this study was born out of curiosity 
about how South Africa is contributing to ending conflicts which have claimed millions of 




The hypotheses are not easily testable or reproducible in different settings in qualitative 
research. Results are also more easily influenced by the researcher’s personal bias. 
The goal of this approach is to find an in-depth understanding of a person’s or group’s 
experience. Ross states: “Qualitative approaches to research are based on a ‘world 
view’ which is holistic and has the following beliefs: there is not a single reality, reality is 
based upon perceptions that are different for each person and change over time and 







Contexts, situations, events, conditions and interactions cannot be repeated to any 
extent nor can overviews be made to a wider context than the one studied with any 
certainty (Hunt, undated). The viewpoints of both researcher and participants have to be 
identified and elucidated because of issues of bias (Hunt, undated). 
 
(b) Strengths 
The researcher’s close involvement enables him or her to gain an insider’s view of the 
field. This allows the researcher to identify issues that are often missed (such as subtle-
ties and complexities) by the scientific enquiries. Qualitative descriptions can also play 
the role of suggesting possible relationships, causes, effects and vigorous processes. 
Because statistics are not used, but rather qualitative research uses a more descriptive, 
narrative style, this research method might be of benefit to the practitioner because she 
or he could turn to qualitative reports to examine forms of knowledge found in these 
reports, thereby gaining new insight. Qualitative research also adds life to social 
analysis (Burns cited in Hughes, undated). 
 
Hammersley (cited in Mkhonto, 2005) adds more advantages of using a qualitative 
research methodology: 
 
The idea of appreciation in qualitative research requires that people’s behaviour be 
understood as making sense within the context in which it occurs. In this study, the 
ability to understand the three presidents’ behaviour as foreign relations actors was 
important. It was particularly vital in the investigation of Mbeki’s foreign policy. The hope 
of the researcher was that it would give insight, for instance, in his mediation in the 
Zimbabwe’s political crisis, because this is an issue that has not been fully understood 
by many ordinary people. 
 
The designatory capacity of qualitative research helps the researcher to capture and 






opportunity to take a closer look at the foreign policy engagements of the three 
presidents through the literature examined. That helped the researcher collect and 
present data as clearly as possible. 
 
This method enables the researcher to reflect before, during and after the research to 
find solutions to the problems in his/her research. This reflective capacity helped the 
researcher plan the way in which this research should be organised, for instance the 
areas that needed to be covered so as to produce a thorough investigation.  
 
The corrective capacity in qualitative research refers to the ability of the research 
methodology to inform and shape existing perceptions of practitioners and political 
decision-makers. The researcher also wanted to test assertions that have been widely 
made about the state of Pretoria’s foreign policy (cited in Mkhonto, 2005). 
 
3.2.2 Research Design 
Research design refers to the blueprint and processes used to achieve the purpose and 
precise aims of the study (Tlale, 2007). Descriptive and explanatory methods were 
chosen because they are the most accurate approaches to investigate this study. 
Research design is a reasonable framework of proof that permits the researcher to find 
out whether achieved interpretations can be generalised (Dlamini, 2000). 
 
(a) Descriptive Research Design 
Descriptive research refers to the type of research question, design, and data analysis 
applied to a chosen topic. It does not fit perfectly in the definition of either quantitative or 
qualitative research methodologies, but rather it can use the basics of both, many times 
within the same research (AECT, 2001).  
 
A good description is important to a research and it has contributed greatly to 





abstract. By showing the existence of social problems, a good description can test 
established assumptions about the way things are and can encourage action (De Vaus, 
2002). Fundamentally, the descriptive method answers the questions, who, what, where 
and how (Sage Publications, undated). 
 
(i) Purpose of Using Descriptive Research Design 
In this study descriptive design denotes issues such as styles in Pretoria’s foreign 
policy, comparative analysis of the three presidents and challenges that South Africa 
faces in engaging in peace diplomacy. The descriptive approach was adopted for 
collecting data. This approach was also fitting because a precise and authentic 
description was needed to investigate whether South Africa’s peace diplomacy has 
made a difference in ending some of the continent’s conflicts. 
 
(b) Explanatory Research Design 
Explanatory research design answers the why questions. While the descriptive 
research, for an example, will describe the rate of crime in an area, the explanatory 
research will answer questions as to why the crime rate is high, why some type of crime 
is high and why the rate is higher in some areas and not in others. Responding to the 
why question involves developing causal explanations. Causal explanations answer 
why phenomenon Y (eg, education level) is affected by factor X (eg, race) (De Vaus, 
2002).  
 
Customarily, a research presented as explanatory is quantitative in nature and naturally 
tests the hypothesis by assessing relationships between variables and the data are 
analysed using statistical techniques. In some cases this term is used occasionally 
synonymously with experimental research with inference that only experiments are 






(i) Purpose of Using Explanatory Research Design 
This approach was used in this study to explain some of the reasons behind the post-
apartheid government foreign policy decisions. The explanatory design was also used 
to expand knowledge about the underlying process of Pretoria’s foreign policy and to 
provide evidence to back or argue and explain opinions and facts (Brotherton, 2008) 
about South African foreign relations. 
 
3.2.3 Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory is a methodology of developing inductive theories that are grounded in 
systematically gathered and analysed data (Bitsch, 2005). It appeals to researchers 
using qualitative techniques for the first time and offers easy-to-follow procedures. In 
this method, definitional properties and categories may be found or generated from the 
qualitative data by using guidelines. Grounded theory is repetitious, needs a slow 
movement between concepts and data and requires a frequent comparison across 
many kinds of proof to control conceptual level of the emerging theory (Lawrence & Tar, 
2013). 
 
Grounded theory is rooted in data that have been methodically obtained by social 
research. In quantitative research, data are collected to test hypotheses. Qualitative 
research starts with a research question and often little else. Theory develops during 
the data collection. This more inductive method means that theory is built from data or 
grounded in the data (Goulding, 2002).  
 
(a) Benefits of Grounded Theory  
One of the advantages of grounded theory is that it gives the research the ecological 
authority. This is the degree to which research findings correctly represent the real 
world. Grounded theories are normally ecologically sound because they are “close” to 






abstract (since their goal is to explain other similar phenomenon), their context is 
unambiguous, detailed and closely linked to the data (Walden University, undated). 
Ecological validity was important for this study to ensure that this research paints an 
accurate picture of Pretoria’s foreign policy. 
 
Because grounded theories are not linked to any pre-existing theory, grounded theories 
are often fresh and hold the potential for pioneering discoveries in science (Walden 
University, undated). Although a lot has been written about Pretoria’s foreign policy, the 
researcher’s aim for this study was to develop a new perspective and insight on the 
dynamics of Pretoria’s peace diplomacy. 
 
Another advantage of grounded theory is the quality of parsimony. This refers to the use 
of the most basic description to explain an intricate phenomenon. Grounded theories 
aim to provide parsimonious explanations about complex phenomena by rendering 
them into abstract constructs and hypothesising their relationships. They offer helpful 
and relatively easy to remember schemata for us to understand our world a little bit 
better (Walden University, undated).  
 
(b) Disadvantages of Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory is an exhaustive method and often this can prevent the researcher 
from seeing the bigger picture in a study. It can be difficult to adopt larger concepts or 
themes when using grounded theory (Meyers, 2008). 
 
(c) Grounded Theory and Data Collection 
As a universal rule, grounded theory researchers should ensure that they have no pre-
conceived theoretical ideas before starting the research. Researchers should make sure 
that they do not introduce concepts to the data – those concepts should emerge from 
the data (Meyers, 2008). The researcher ensured that she set aside all ideas she had 





Grounded theory “provides the researcher with an opportunity of having the data inform 
the research and consequently discovering the theoretical principles that are relevant to 
the situation under investigation, rather than the converse relationship which is more 
customarily applied with conventional research methods”. Grounded theory allows 
researchers to get into the field, and quickly attain an empirically grounded insight of 
social phenomena, and evaluate the phenomena without reliance on existing theory. 
The research allows theory to develop through the inductive process of grounded theory 
(Jones, Kriflik, & Zanko, 2005).  
 
3.2.4 Data Collection and Analysis  
Data collection is led either by predetermined theories and ideas about what is vital or 
is guided by the clues that avail themselves in data collection process. Examining data 
from the beginning of data collection is what makes grounded theory “grounded”, (Ezzy, 
2002). The researcher was the only instrument of collecting data for this study. 
 
Brink and Wood note that qualitative data collection methods are flexible and 
unstructured; they capture verbatim reports or observable characteristics and generate 
data that usually do not take numerical form. Words, films, postcards, art and all 
sensory data are considered qualitative data unless they are transformed into some 
numerical system (cited in Mamabolo, 2006).  
 
A researcher makes sense of the deluge of information he or she consults in a study 
through data analysis. It is a process of separating data into components to show its 
elements and structure (Dey, 1993). Burns and Grove add that data analysis is a 
process of codifying data to produce findings that will be interpreted by the researcher 
(cited in Mamabolo, 2006). The researcher analysed the content of written documents 
used in this study “to identify patterns that can be evaluated to uncover qualitative 
meaning” (Reed & Padskocimaite, 2012). “Without analysis, we would have to rely 






and intuitions have their place in analysing data, we can also benefit from the more 
rigorous and logical procedures of analysis” (Dey, 1993). 
 
Data analysis pertains to the separation of elements into component parts. It includes 
the study of intricate phenomena in order to classify their simple elements. Data 
analysis requires the researcher to find the major components or universal principles 
located in a particular phenomenon, so that they can be used to provide a clear picture 
of that phenomenon (Denscombe, 2007). 
 
There is no strict division between data collection and analysis; the process is a cycle of 
data collection and analysis which is aimed at finding results of the analysis that will 
ultimately shape the subsequent collections of data (Macome, 2002). 
 
The main methods used in this approach include interviews, focus groups, observation, 
collection of documented material such as letters, diaries, photographs, collection of 
narrative and open-ended questionnaires (Hancock, Windridge, & Ockleford, 2009) and 
(Yousey & Masek, 2007). The researcher did not do interviews or focus groups because 
this study used data collected mainly from documents. 
 
3.2.5 Data Management 
This refers to the consolidation of data from its initial uses in the research cycle up to 
the publishing and filing of sound results. “It aims to ensure reliable verification of 
results, and permits new and innovative research built on existing information” (Whyte & 
Tedds, 2011). The data management system used by the researcher included 
developing lists of sources of data and categorising information according to the subject 
discussed in each document. The researcher also used the filing system of both 
computer-based and hard copy data. This was aimed at navigating the data easily 






and idealism, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, Mbeki’s foreign policy, Mandela’s 
foreign policy, Zuma’s foreign policy, Zimbabwe’s quiet diplomacy, the DRC mediation, 
Burundi mediation, Cote d’Ivoire mediation.  
 
3.2.6 Document Analysis 
In a desktop study, a researcher investigates and analyses documents relevant to the 
study. Some include archival research, legal research, literature and periodicals review, 
policy review, textual/content analysis, and public records research an (Agbaje & 
Alarape, 2006) and (Reed and Padskocimaite, 2012). 
 
The documents used in this study  
Government sources included, The African Renaissance Statement of Deputy 
President, Thabo Mbeki, Gallagher Estate (1998); Presentation on the Revised White 
Paper on South African international Peace Missions; White Paper on South African 
Participation in International Peace Missions, (1999); 10 Years of Peacekeeping (2009), 
Report of the Minister of the Department of International Relations & Cooperation; 
Policy discussion document (2012); Presidency: Twenty-year review (2014); African 
Union in a Nutshell (2012) and Government Communications Press Briefings (2014). 
 
Scholarly sources included, Introductory Lectures on Research Methodology, (2001); 
South Africa's Role and Importance in Africa and the Development of the African 
Agenda (2004), An Encumbered Regional Power? The Capacity Gap in South Africa’s 
Peace Diplomacy in Africa (2009); Burundi: IRIN Focus on Mandela Mediation (1999); 
Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments 
(2012); Leaning All Over the Place? The Not-So-New South Africa’s Foreign Policy 
(1997); South Africa’s Regional Engagement for Peace and Security, (2007); The AU, 
Nepad and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa (2004); Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s 
Saviour? (2003); Studies on South Africa’s Foreign Policy after Isolation (2006);  






Council 2011-2012; South Africa in Peacemaking in West Africa. South Africa’s Role in 
Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa (2006); Theoretical Framework for 
Conflict Resolution (1998) and Pulpit Morality or Penny pinching Diplomacy - A 
Discursive Debate on Mandela’s Foreign Policy (2002) . 
 
The researcher checked whether the documents used related to the research questions 
and the purpose of their publication. She also determined if the content of the 
documents suited the theoretical framework of this study. In the case of previous 
research projects, the researcher did not only examine the study findings but also 
checked the design, methods, instruments and conceptual framework, as suggested by 
Bowen (Bowen, 2009). 
 
Researchers should ensure that the data consulted is of professional quality. Checking 
aspects such as authorship and reliability of the data forms part of the review process of 
data. (Nieuwenhuis, 2012) and (Reed and Padskocimaite, 2012). To meet this 
requirement, the researcher discarded 23 documents from obscure sources, such as 
those without names of authors and untraceable internet addresses. 
 
For quality control, the researcher verified the authenticity of the documents used in the 
study – those sourced from the internet and hard copy articles obtained from libraries. 
About 85% of the articles used were sourced from reputable scientific journals and 
written by reputable academics, analysts and post graduates. The rest were either 
government documents/news reports or media reports. In verifying the documents, the 
researcher wanted to check the motives of writing the documents – that is, who wrote 
them and why as suggested by Macdonald (Macdonald, 2008). 
 
(a) Characteristics of Document Analysis 
Document analysis depends on data observed by others and, for this reason, the 
researcher has to test the data for genuineness, accuracy and importance. Document 






If the researcher has access to the documents in his or her interest area, document 
review can be a cost-effective method for desk research or projects with limited 
budgets. It is also a good way to learn about an unfamiliar subject to gather contextual 
information (Reed and Padskocimaite, 2012). 
 
(c) Limitations 
Document review can become time-consuming when the researcher does not delineate 
clear boundaries. One scholar states that the most common problem with research is 
“the difficulty of knowing when to stop searching” (cited in Reed and Padskocimaite). 
The researcher spent a lot of time dedicated to this study on literature review, an 
exercise that impacted on the time given to the other areas of the study. In the case of 
archival research, the researcher had to rely on information collected by others, which 
might not always be accurate and complete (Reed and Padskocimaite, 2012).  
 
3.2.7 Data Reduction  
This is a process in which the researcher whittles down the data collected to what is 
most relevant for the study. Not only data need to be reduced for the sake of 
manageability, but they have to be transformed, so that they can be made intelligible in 
terms of the issues being addressed (Berkowitz, 1996). The process helped the 
researcher select just more than 250 sources out of the 350 that she had consulted.  
 
3.2.8 Trustworthiness 
Guba’s four criteria for trustworthiness include the following: 
(a) Credibility – All approaches used by the researcher are recognised research 
methods utilised by many other analysts. The researcher also consulted with four peers 






also made reference to previous studies not only to present findings but to familiarise 
herself with what had been published.  
 
(b) Transferability – This refers to the provision of background data to establish the 
framework of study and the thorough description of phenomenon in question to allow 
assessments to be made. The researcher ensured that the study included background / 
 
(c) Dependability – This relates to the methodological description to allow the study to 
be repeated. The researcher provided a thorough description of methods used in the 
study. 
 
(d) Confirmability – This refers to the in-depth methodological description to allow the 
integrity of research results to be examined. The researcher spelt out limitations in the 
methods used in the study (cited in Shenton, 2004). 
 
3.2.9 Limitations Associated with the Methodology 
Upon reflection, the area that became challenging for the researcher was managing the 
data. The reason for this is that printing documents became too expensive because the 
researcher underestimated the number of documents that she needed to examine for 
this study. The researcher had anticipated using 60 documents but ended up using 
more than 200 documents and books. Managing data from so many sources became 
overwhelming, thus requiring a carefully planned system to organise the information. 
 
The researcher used too many sources. Consulting fewer sources could have saved the 
researcher time so that she could give sufficient attention to other areas of the study 
such as making notes and gaining more understanding of the subject under 






3.3 Theoretical Framework 
3.3.1 What is a Theoretical Framework? 
Defining the theoretical framework is important because it is the construct that charts 
the trajectory of this study. Theory is an intellectual framework that enables a 
researcher to choose facts and interpret them so that recurrences and regularities in 
phenomena can be explained and predicted (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999).  
 
Theory is also defined as a network of interlinked concepts that provide a 
comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena. Guba and Lincoln 
state that theoretical frameworks possess ontological (knowledge of the way things are), 
epistemological assumptions (how things really work in an assumed reality) and are 
methodological (cited in Jabareen, 2009). 
 
Theories help us understand the avalanche of information that we come across all the 
time. Even policy makers, who often don’t see the need of theory, rely on their ideas 
about how the world functions when they want to take decisions. One cannot be able to 
make a good policy if one’s fundamental organising principles are wrong, just as it is 
difficult to develop sound theories without knowing the real world (Walt, 2004). 
 
Cox states that while theories follow reality because their formulation is based on 
previous experience, they come before the reality in the sense that they are used by 
those who produce that reality (cited in Williams, 2000).  
 
Nossal notes that theory helps us understand the world that shapes assumptions and 
simplifies complex phenomena that we attempt to examine (cited in Mabuda, 2008). 
Successful conceptual constructs such as Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs or Bruner’s 
Spiral Theory of Learning can provide mental images of frameworks that have 






The following illustrate what international relations theory is. 
Theories elucidate the laws of international politics or the recurring patterns of national 
behaviour (Waltz, 1979). In other words, theories explain why each state behaves in a 
particular way when dealing with a particular issue. 
 
Without theory, we would be unable to make sense of facts. Theory helps us organise 
facts so that they can be understandable and they can give meaning to what we are 
trying to learn (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999). 
 
It is a framework used to test hypotheses about the world we live in. Theory enables us 
to disapprove a hypothesis or statement through empirical evidence (empirical theory). 
Theory is a framework of the way the world should be and focuses on the exploration of 
values and what should be done based on those values. (normative theory) 
 
It criticises forms of domination and perspectives which make the socially constructed 
and changeable seem natural and unalterable. It is an ideological assessment of how 
the present leads to future paths to change, freedom and human autonomy (critical 
theory) (cited in Burchill, 2001) and (cited in Youla, 2009). 
 
The importance of theories lies in the fact that they help us understand the phenomena 
we investigate (Youla, 2009). Halliday states that there are three reasons why theories 
are vital: first they help us differentiate significant facts from those which are not, 
second, any group of facts, even if accepted as true and important, can be interpreted in 
different ways and third no human being can be satisfied with facts alone because all 
activities in our society involve the morality which cannot be decided by facts (cited in 
Youla, 2009). 
 
3.3.2 International Relations Theories 
The realist school of thought is one of the two principal theories which is said to have 





South Africa’s democracy. The other theory is idealism – a moral consideration rooted 
in South Africa’s struggle and its success in bringing political transformation in the 
country in 1994. The liberation movement did not only find financial support and other 
resources over a number of decades, but its huge success was in convincing other 
countries to punish the white minority government with sanctions “on the moral ground 
that apartheid was a crime against humanity” (Gelb, 2001). 
 
Although real change in Pretoria’s foreign policy took place even before Mbeki became 
president, it was during his presidency that South Africa instituted real change in the 
policy, from idealist to realists (Pfister, 2006) and (Petré, 2011). The realities of the 
international and African arena have (also) driven the way Pretoria thinks of, frames, 
and implements foreign policy. This evolution has been characterised by three key 
trends: the move away from Mandela’s idealism towards a national interest-centred 
discourse on foreign policy; the leaning towards Africa as the centrepiece of foreign 
policy and the use of multilateralism not merely as a principle but as a tool of realpolitik 
(Mde & Wilson, 2013). 
(a) Realism 
Realism is a theory that describes and explains international politics as it is, rather than 
how we like it to be. Realists see the world as a dangerous and insecure place, where 
violence is inevitable (Burchill, 2001), (Greene, 2009) and (Slaughter, 2011). Realism 
appeared partly in response to the failure to maintain peace after WWI (1914-1918) and 
this era saw the emergence of liberalism. The aftermath of that war caused many to 
blame realpolitik foreign policies developed by Europe’s major powers (Rourke, 2007) 
and (Saylor Foundation, 2012).  
 
Realists believe there is no way of avoiding international anarchy. It is impossible to 
think that a world government could be established because states would not be safe 
enough to give up power (Weber, 2005). However, not all realists believe that the 






possibility of moral judgement in international politics. Rather, they are critical of 
moralism – abstract moral discourse that does not take into account political realities. 
They assign supreme value to successful political action based on prudence: the ability 
to judge the rightness of a given action from among possible alternatives on the basis of 
its likely political consequences” (Korab-Karpowicz, 2013). 
 
People who are realists are Westphalians fiercely attached to the principle of 
sovereignty, sceptical about the doctrine of liberal interventionism and defending the 
claim that the state is the key actor in international relations (Spence, 2011). In recent 
years the classic realism of the 20th century has been replaced by neo-realism, which is 
an attempt to establish a scientific study of international relations (Korab-Karpowicz, 
2013). Mbeki’s peace diplomacy in Zimbabwe is an example of this thinking of realists 
because it dealt only with the state and the opposition as the key actors. According to 
Mlambo and Raftopolous, Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy ignored the participation of the civil 
society initially and that resulted in many Zimbabweans not taking South Africa’s 
mediation of that country’s political crisis seriously (cited in Mhango, 2013).  
 
Realists assert that all that is not right with the world, from a rational point of view, are 
the forces found in human nature. To make the world better, one must work with these 
forces because trying to work against them will be a futile exercise (Chidozie, Agbude, 
& Oni, 2013). 
 
(i) Assumptions of Realism  
Realism is primarily about power, where power is defined in terms of military strength. 
Realists assume that within the hierarchy of international priorities, national security is 
usually the most important concern. They focus on actual or potential conflict between 
states. Classical realists assume that states – like the “men” who make them up, are by 
nature self-centred and hostile and will pursue their interests to the detriment of others 






neo-realists – only agree that states are self-centred. They see the state as the primary 
actor in international relations. Realists assume that actors in state affairs are required 
to speak with one voice and resolve political differences within the state authoritatively. 
There really is only one mechanism for peace and that is maintaining a “balance of 
power” (Benson, undated).  
 
Morgenthau states that the policies aimed at protecting the international balance of 
power are not only unavoidable but are vital factors in the international community (cited 
in Toledo, undated). In his work, Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau, who is regarded 
as the father of realism, states that realism assumes that the world is made up of people 
who have contrasting interests and conflict is unavoidable (Morgenthau, undated). 
Morgenthau’s theory is based on the following principles: Politics is governed by 
objective laws that have their roots in human nature. This means it is possible to 
develop a theory that reflects these laws and to differentiate between truth and opinion. 
We can “put ourselves in the position of a statesman” and predict what he should 
rationally do (Morgenthau, undated).  
 
Interest is defined in terms of power. This sets politics apart from other spheres of 
action, such as economics (interest defined in terms of wealth). Because we can 
assume a definition of interest, we do not have to concern ourselves with questions of 
“motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen” 
(Morgenthau, undated).  
 
Nonetheless, Morgenthau also notes that the intellect can affect a statesman’s ability to 
understand vital aspects of foreign policy and turn them into political action. Not all 
foreign policies will fit in the framework predicted by realism because of personal 
shortcomings and irrationality. “Rational foreign policy is a good foreign policy because 
it minimises risks and benefits and hence complies both with moral precepts of 






The notion of defining interest as power is often valid, although its meaning can change. 
Morgenthau states that power is “anything that establishes and maintains the control of 
man over man”. Also, the centrality of the nation state can be altered over time. “While 
the realist, indeed, believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political 
action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and 
the nation state is a product of history, and is, therefore, bound to disappear in the 
course of history” (Morgenthau, undated). 
 
Moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in the abstract; the 
circumstances of time and place determine if this can happen. The state’s survival is 
above moral good. Thus, prudence – “the weighing of the consequences of alternative 
political actions” is the “supreme virtue in politics”. What a state does is judged by its 
outcomes (Morgenthau, undated).  
 
There is a huge difference between political realism and other schools. Realism 
maintains the autonomy of the political sphere and, while acknowledging that 
knowledge about human nature (“economic man”, “religious man”, etc.) exists, it asserts 
that the “political man” is the appropriate facet for the study of politics. “Legalistic-
moralist” standards do not fit in politics (Morgenthau, undated).  
 
Realists also believe that states always compete for power, participating in an inevitable 
battle for survival. This aligns with realists’ pure power construct which assert that, in 
their bid to enhance power, states can disrespect old friendships. The case of South 
Africa cutting ties with Taiwan in favour of China is an example of this. Realists assert 
that it would be disastrous if a country’s foreign policy was formulated on emotions 
(Naidoo, 2000).  
 
Naidoo concludes that for realists, morality has no room in international relations; all 
states have no choice but are forced to play by the book of the system to practise power 






moral issue comes in the way of that, they can only abandon an issue concerned with 
morality. The national interest equals security and survival. A true and wise statesman 
is the one who is able to promote the country’s national interests, which is a moral duty 
defined in political terms and guided by the considerations of prudence (Kiseleva, 
2014). 
 
However, Naidoo states that modern realists agree that governments cannot ignore 
moral consideration in foreign policy decisions making. What they need to guard against 
is that moral dimension does not dictate foreign policy (Naidoo, 2000). Mkalipi adds: 
“Realists argue that the contradiction between foreign policy discourse and foreign 
policy behaviour is a product of being self-interested.” (Mkalipi, 2002).  
 
(b) Idealism 
Like realism, idealism has also profoundly shaped the way many politicians and 
theorists in the West think about international relations and world politics, since the time 
of English philosopher John Locke (Strohmer, 2010). 
 
The Earl of Birkenhead defines idealism as a spirit which calls an individual or group of 
individuals to uphold higher moral standards than what they would normally practise 
(Earl of Birkenhead, 1923) and (Wilson, 2011). According to Birkenhead, there is 
acknowledgement that idealism is highly ambitious and is a theory seen as promoting 
what should be than the reality (Earl of Birkenhead, 1923). That is why Spence calls 
idealism a bed rock of moral conviction (Spence, 2011). 
 
Idealistic political beliefs that US president Woodrow Wilson, one of the advocates of an 
international authority for the management of international relations, spoke about 
include that democracy should be promoted in all countries because it is one of the 
accepted generalisations of international relations that democracies do not go to war 






accountability, are vital controls over the ambitions of national leaders. 
Interconnectedness between countries encourages interdependence and raises the 
costs of conflict. When one nation engages in war with another, often their allies also 
get involved in the way of giving military aid. And upholding international law and 
creating international organisations will also promote peace and co-operation (Nel cited 
in Youla, 2009). 
 
While there are many versions of idealism, all idealists agree that human nature is 
good (Strohmer, 2010). For the purpose of this study, idealism is supported by 
liberalism because Pretoria’s foreign policy “is also influenced by this ideology” 
(Jordaan, 2010).  
 
Spence defines liberalism as a tradition that promotes democratic self-determination 
together with the economic and social goals derived from free market economy 
(Spence, 2011). It is seen as a tradition of political thought comprised practical goals 
and ideals, where the individual is the most important actor and possesses rights (Viotti 
& Kauppi, 1999). Liberalism is about measurement of power through state economies, 
the potential for peace and consolidation and political liberties and rights. Jumarang 
opines that liberalism is no longer an aspiration of how politics “ought to be”, but is now 
a political theory of peace generated in the anarchic environment and even in the state’s 
quest for power (Jumarang, 2011). 
 
The state’s principal function is to act as an arbiter in conflicts between individuals and 
ensuring that individuals enjoy their rights (Spence, 2011). “The carnage of the WWI 
was principally responsible for the upsurge in liberalist thinking. With (Woodrow) Wilson 
at the vanguard, the belief that conflict could be controlled and eventually resolved 







Classical and modern liberals concur that the government has a responsibility to be 
impartial and, therefore, treating people equally is vital and that the government should 
be disinterested in evaluating what good life is. The liberal aspires for the best form of 
government which will allow each citizen to pursue life according to his or her frame of 
reference within a neutral framework (Moseley, undated). Liberalism asserts that 
protecting and increasing the liberty of the individual are the problems of politics. 
Liberals believe that the government’s main responsibility is to ensure that individuals 
are not harmed by others. They must also be watchful that the government does not 
curtail freedom (Lerner, undated). 
 
However, Best bemoans the other side of liberalism as he says: “We are winning many 
battles in the fight for freedom, rights, democracy, compassionate ethics, peace, 
interspecies justice. But we are losing the war. The war against greed, violence, 
plunder, profits, and domination, the war against corporations, world banks, the US 
empire, and Western military machines, the war against meta-stasizing systems of 
economic growth, technological development, overproduction, overconsumption, and 
overpopulation” (Best, 2010). 
 
(i) Assumptions of Liberal Idealism  
Bad human behaviour, such as hostility, is not the product of flawed people but of 
depraved institutions that expose people to selfish practices and the urge to hurt others 
(Benson, undated).  
 
War and international anarchy are not inevitable and war’s frequency can be decreased 
by boosting powers of the institutional arrangements that promote peace among nations 
(Benson, undated).  
 
A conflict is an international scourge requiring collective or multilateral efforts, rather 






ethical concern for the welfare and security for all people, and this humanitarian effort 
requires the inclusion of morality in the make-up of the state (Benson, undated). 
 
Countries which have adopted the liberal/idealistic approach design foreign and 
domestic policies that strive to secure maximum societal welfare and happiness, to 
promote democracy, human rights and peaceful co-existence. They prefer to interact 
closely with countries that have similar interest as theirs. They are supportive of 
democratic governments and movements elsewhere, and are generally critical and non-
co-operative, but not necessarily hostile, towards authoritarian regimes” (Olivier, 2006).  
 
Closely related to liberalism is the liberationist approach. This is a theory that puts into 
practice democratisation and development. The enunciation of human rights, for 
example, is viewed as a weapon of disenfranchised groups and classes battling for 
freedom and empowerment (Osaghae, 2005). When illustrating the shifts in South 
Africa’s foreign policy, Jordaan paints a picture of two positions Pretoria’s policy has 
adopted since the birth of democracy (Jordaan, 2010). The author tables the following 
differences between liberal and liberation positions: 
 
Liberals believe in liberal democracy while liberationists can curtail or delay liberties for 
the sake of political stability and economic development. An example of the latter was 
seen in Mbeki’s mediation in Zimbabwe. Mbeki’s bid to bring peace in Zimbabwe 
ignored loud outcries of human rights abuses of ordinary Zimbabweans (Jordaan, 
2010). “For Mbeki, the link was between the state and the economy and between peace 
and development” (Landsberg, 2008). 
 
To liberals, human rights are universal but for liberationists rights are not as important 
as national sovereignty, especially when there is a conflict between the two. For liberals 
the Western dominated order is acceptable but the liberationists prefer solidarity with 






While liberals aspire to evaluate human relations and universal agreement on moral 
questions, the liberationists see racial and cultural relations as hostile and laden with 
hierarchy, power and unfair representations, and seek equal worth of non-Western 
cultures (Jordaan, 2010).  
 
Liberals believe in the neo-liberal economic order and they look out for the consistent 
application of international economic regulations and have more concern for the 
disenfranchised. Although they are unable to define what this order should look like, 
they believe, it would be accommodative of the interests of the developing nations. 
Domestically, liberals promote free trade, while liberationists support a greater state 
involvement in the economy (Jordaan, 2010).  
 
Jordaan blames Mbeki for Pretoria’s foreign policy shift to liberationist thought but also 
adds that Zuma’s government continued from where Mbeki’s government left off. The 
author suggests that the liberationist approach is thriving because it is supported by the 
governing ANC and has been encouraged by the lack of strong diverse opposition and 
re-racialisation of South Africa’s politics (Jordaan, 2010). Support for Zimbabwe is an 
example of how Pretoria has followed the liberation approach and abandoned protection 
of human rights (Jordaan, 2010). 
  
Bogert concurs as he notes: “South Africa, whose democratisation owes much to 
international pressure on the apartheid regime and support for the ANC during 
apartheid, no longer speaks up for the liberation struggles in Western Sahara and Tibet 
and has remained silent about the authoritarian abuses in Burma, even though Burma 
was vocal in its opposition to apartheid” (Bogert, 2008). Rather than speaking up for 
human rights victims, as the democratic South Africa set out to do, or defend other 
liberation organisations, Pretoria keeps solidarity with the serving leaders of the 
developing nations strong, regardless of how they rule, a reaction that is even sturdier 






The Economist also concurs as it observed that Zuma had become friends with the 
dictators as his predecessor was. Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Equatorial Guinea’s 
Teodoro Obiang Nguema, Swaziland’s King Mswati III and Zimbabwe President Robert 
Mugabe were invited to his first inauguration. The Economist notes that Zuma has not 
raised the issue of human rights in the open during his travels overseas. The publication 
also notes that he was conspicuously silent over the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to a 
Chinese dissident, Liu Xiaobo (The Economist, 2010). 
 
(ii) Distinction between realism and idealism 
Terminologies used in the decisions on foreign relations spell out clearly the difference 
between realism and idealism. Realist are concerned with order, power and interest 
while idealists are concerned with peace and how best to secure it through, for instance, 
collective security stipulated by international institutions. Accordingly, realists are 
committed to the principle of autonomy (Spence, 2011). 
 
Idealists frown upon the concept of absolute sovereignty; they see it as an old-
fashioned principle that should be set aside when gross violation of human rights 
occurs. While idealists always strive to attain welfare and security for the citizens, 
realists assert that it is only in its advanced form that the state can provide security, 
welfare and a sense of identity for its citizens. On the other hand liberals often argue 
that the idea of sovereign statehood is a declining asset because governments have to 
cope with the growing pressure of globalisation (Spence, 2011). State leaders act to 
increase power and will only work together temporarily if co-operation serves their 
interests (Saylor Foundation, 2012). 
(iii) Assumptions of Liberation Theory Articulated by Ricky Sherover-
Marcuse 
Liberation is the abolition of the effects and the removal of the causes of social 






oppressed groups free. Altman states that liberation refers to freedom for the fulfilment 
of human potential, a large part of which has been unnecessarily restricted by tradition, 
prejudice and the requirements of social organisation (cited in Mulé, 2006). 
 
No one is naturally or genetically tyrannical and no human being is born an oppressor. 
People are not naturally or genetically designed to be oppressed; nor born to be 
oppressed. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adds: “All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (United 
Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, undated a). 
 
Sherover-Marcuse points out that oppression is the systematic and pervasive abuse of 
individuals on the basis of their membership in various groups, which are disadvantaged 
by the institutionalised imbalances in social power in a particular society. Oppression 
includes both institutionalised or “normalised” maltreatment and incidents of violence. It 
includes the denial, or the non-recognition of the complete humanness (the goodness, 
uniqueness, smartness, powerfulness, etc.) of those who are members of the 
mistreated group (Sherover-Marcuse, undated). 
 
Biological/cultural/ethnic/sexual/religious/age differences between human beings are 
never the cause of oppression. The use of these differences to explain either why 
certain groups of people are repressed (or) why certain groups of people behave 
oppressively, works as a justification of oppression (Sherover-Marcuse, undated). 
Differences in class, in social and economic power, in educational opportunity and 
achievement, in health and physical well-being, depict the results of institutionalised 
inequalities in opportunities. Such differences propagate and increase the social 







3.3.3 Conflict Resolution Theory 
Over the years, the discipline of conflict resolution has established insights into the 
nature and sources of conflict and how they should be dealt with through peaceful 
methods to ensure lasting agreements (Dixit, 2004). According to Dixit, Deutsch, one of 
the pioneers who developed academic writings on benefits of peaceful settlements, 
noted that factors such as the nature of dispute and the goals aimed at achieving peace 
are crucial in determining what solutions each party will bring to negotiations in an effort 
to contribute to resolving the conflict (Dixit, 2004). Each conflict takes a life of its own 
that changes with time as the warring parties alter strategies and respond to each 
other’s actions (Coady, 2012). 
 
The Zimbabwe’s conflict is a case in point. Although negotiations were one of the 
constant efforts to end crisis in that country, the conflict between Mugabe’s government 
and the opposition factions changed over time. These changes included the 
government’s use of the media as a propaganda machine to violence against opposition 
supporters. “The violence came to a climax when, after losing the March 2008 
presidential election, President Mugabe carried out widespread state-sponsored 
violence and terror. Human rights violations, including torture, beatings, mutilations and 
rape were perpetrated against leaders of the opposition and the supporters of the 
opposition. Even after Mugabe won the June run-off election, routine and arbitrary 
arrests and detentions continued as Zanu-PF used repression to back its dubious claim 
to power” (ICRP, 2008). Another strategy of Mugabe’s government was the 
announcement that white farmers had to give their land to the government in 2014 
(Rotberg, 2014).  
 
Zimbabwean opposition went from seeking support from South Africa’s union federation 
Cosatu to agreeing to be part of the coalition government, among many of its strategies. 
“MDC gave in to the arm-twisting of regional heads of state and agreed to become part 
of an inclusive government, the government of national unity, with Zanu-PF in February 






Since the devastation of WWII, nations and other non-state parties around the world 
have chosen conflict settlement at the international level. Reasons for this include the 
threat of nuclear war and the Cold War which ended in the late 80s and gave way to 
businesslike relationship among international relations role players, characterised by 
summitry between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. These meetings 
also discussed weapon control, army deployments and other trust-building measures 
which were directed at decreasing tensions and the potential for war threat in crisis 
situations (Babbit & Osler Hampson, 2011). 
 
The Human Needs Theory, which is one of principal theories used in this study was 
formulated in the 80s by theorist John Burton. The reason for choosing this theory is 
that it fits in the conflict resolution the South African government has engaged in in the 
past 20 years. Burton’s theory asserts that human beings have basic needs that have to 
be met in order to have a stable society. In other words, stability has no chance in a 
society as long as there is a group or a section of that society whose needs have not 
been met. The theorist believed that people involved in disputes were instinctively 
battling in their institutional environments at all social levels to satisfy basic and 
universal needs – such as security, identity, recognition and development. They 
struggled to gain control of their environment required to ensure the fulfilment of these 
needs. This struggle could not be restrained because it was fundamental (cited in 
Cunningham, 1998). This battle for basic needs is theoretically related to the 
Frustration-Aggression theory, which is based on the stimulus-response hypothesis 
(cited in Cunningham, 1998). 
 
Burton supported the work of need theorists such as Paul Sites who believed the real 
source of power was tied to a person’s needs such as those for consistency, security, 
recognition, justice and a sense of control. (cited in Cunningham, 1998). The pursuit of 
these basic needs is the cause of many conflicts that have affected many nations 
around the world. Conventional methods of settlement such as talks, mediation and 
arbitration deal with superficial interests and do not deal with underlying needs and 





An example of a war that resulted from unmet basic needs was Sudan’s conflict 
between the Khartoum government and the Christians of the South. Mbeki was 
instrumental in leading mediation in that conflict. Grievances of the people of the South 
included economic and religious oppression. After a conflict that claimed 1.5 million 
lives and resulted in four million of refuges, a settlement was reached in that country. It 
resulted in the birth of South Sudan in 2011 (BBC News, 2014). 
 
Although violence between the warring parties could subside because of mediation and 
ceasefire and the intervention of peacekeeping, there is no guarantee that peace will be 
permanent, notes Burton. The theorist also adds that it is the frustration caused by the 
inability to meet these needs that results in aggression which leads to conflict. The 
theorist notes that the difference between the Human Needs Theory and the 
Frustration-Aggression theories is that the former deals with basic needs while the latter 
is concerned with wants and desires (cited in Cunningham, 1998). 
 
Burton cautions that conflict is inevitable as long as basic needs such as identity, equal 
justice and the pursuit of all other human societal developmental needs are not met in 
multi-ethnic societies. “It is a frustration-based protest against lack of opportunities for 
development and against lack of recognition and identity. Whether the tension, conflict 
or violence have origins in class, status, ethnicity, sex, religion or nationalism, we are 
dealing with the same fundamental issues,” says Burton (cited in Cunningham, 
1998).The theorist reasons that conflict resolution is aimed at changing the political, 
social and economic systems. “It is an analytical and problem-solving process that takes 
into account such individual and group needs as identity and recognition, as well as 
institutional changes that are required to satisfy these needs” (cited in Cunningham, 
1998).  
 
3.3.4 Track-One and Track-Two Diplomacy 






come together to find solution to a conflict. It is often referred to as official government 
diplomacy or government technique (Nan, 2003). Government officials, representatives 
of inter-governmental organisations and third-party governments often make up the 
Track-One delegation while non-governmental and unofficial groups and individuals are 
often the actors who make up the Track-Two set-up (Hottinger, 2005) and (Hislaire, 
2011). 
 
Track-Two diplomacy is an unofficial, informal interaction between members of 
adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and 
organise human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict 
(Montville, 1991). Montville is credited for devising this method of diplomacy in the 80s 
(Chigas, 2003), (Naidoo, 2000), (Coady, 2012) and (Yesiladali, 2005).  
 
Between Track-One and Track-Two is Track One-and-Half. This is a “public or private 
interaction between official representatives of conflicting governments or political 
entities such as popular armed movements, which is facilitated or mediated by a third 
party not representing a political organisation or institution. The aim of such interaction 
is to influence change of attitudes between the parties, with the objective of changing 
the political power structures that caused the conflict” (Mapendere, 2000). 
 
While representatives involved in Track-Two interventions are non-officials, they are 
influential individuals who engage in direct joint analysis of the dispute and joint problem 
solving (Kotzé, 2002) and (Chigas, 2003). Track-Two diplomacy is required to maintain 
the balance of public exposure of the process and confidentiality. The reason for this is 
that this kind of diplomacy serves to influence public opinion so as to encourage 
acceptance of discussions between representatives from the rival parties. It is hoped 
that this diplomacy will encourage formal negotiations (Kotzé, 2002).  
 
During the Burundi peace talks, Track-Two diplomacy became an effective tool to bring 






retired ANC MP Jan Van Eck contributed in paving the way for the eventual peace 
settlement in Burundi. Although he faced suspicion from the local leaders at the 
beginning, after confidence building, the warring sides eventually agreed to become part 
of talks. Because of the progress made at that stage, the warring parties continued with 
talks under the mediation of former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere who was 
succeeded by Mandela and eventually Zuma (Yesiladali, 2005).  
 
In many peace missions, it would be a mistake to assume that one track could work 
independently from the others, or that you can completely separate the track roles to the 
extent that each level can work on its own, leaving the others (Hottinger, 2005).  
Montville also concurs as he notes that Track-Two diplomacy does not replace the 
Track-One set-up, but compensates for the pressure put on leaders by their people’s 
psychological expectations. Most important, Track-Two diplomacy is intended to boost 
Track-One negotiations (Mapendere, 2001). Hottinger further notes that Track-Two 
actors have played a significant role in relation to armed groups and peacemaking 
(Hottinger, 2005). 
 
One of the types of conflicts that Track-Two diplomacy was developed to deal with was 
protracted social conflict – a conflict that is based, particularly, on identity-related needs, 
ethno-national or communal groups (Cunningham, 1998). Azar states that these identity 
groups wage a campaign to get their distinctive identity in the society. “When they are 
denied physical and economic security, political participation, and recognition from other 
groups, their distinctive identity is lost, and they will do whatever is in their power to 
regain it. In short, this is the origin of protracted social conflict,” (cited in Cunningham). 
 
Traditional negotiations and mediation work well to resolve issues such as poverty, land 
issues, power sharing and distribution of wealth. But issues of identity survival and other 
fears can only be dealt with in a process that works directly to change human 
relationships, promoting mutual understanding and acknowledgement of concerns of a 






(a) Strengths and Weaknesses of Track-One Diplomacy 
Official diplomatic efforts are often sufficiently funded compared with unofficial efforts. 
Track-One diplomacy officials also have access to information, security and logistical 
resources not available to unofficial efforts (Fahim, 2012). The limitation of this line of 
diplomacy is that it is guided by official policies and, therefore, can be restricted in its 
flexibility to take decisions. For instance, it could be difficult for officials in Track-One 
diplomacy to explore new ideas unofficially, unless these ideas have official support. But 
such support might not be available until preliminary exploratory discussions (Fahim, 
2012).  
(b) Strengths and Weaknesses of Track-Two Diplomacy 
Unlike political leaders, Track-Two officials do not fear losing constituencies because 
they are often the constituency (Mapendere, 2000). Track-Two parties are less 
intimidating to armed groups and find it easier to work flexibly, unofficially and off-the-
record, and have less to worry about when conveying official/legal recognition. Lacking 
geopolitical interests and stakes in the conflict, they may be more disinterested, forming 
relationships with a wider variety of actors in the conflict (Hottinger, 2005).  
 
Like any other process, Track-Two diplomacy has shortcomings. It can take too long to 
produce results. Its participants have very little chance of making an impact once the 
conflict has reached a war stage. Participants of this diplomacy often have no resources 
for bargaining during talks and for the implementations of settlements. Track-Two 
diplomacy is doomed to fail in authoritarian governments because leaders of such 
regimes do not take advice from civilian leaders. Track-Two representatives sometime 
lack co-ordination because they come from various organisations (Mapendere, 2000). 
 
They also lack the capacity to compel or coerce parties, can sometimes have difficulty 
in becoming part of the peace process (especially, with state actors), and cannot 
provide the same incentives and guarantees as Track-One actors. Importantly, they 
often lack resources and financial support, especially for their more long-term work that 





3.3.5 Peacekeeping Theory 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Fetherston is not satisfied with the volume of theory 
generated on peacekeeping. “Peacekeeping’s primary shortcoming is insufficient 
theoretical work that would allow researchers, policy analysts, and practitioners to 
address the still highly troublesome issues of increasing effectiveness and success, 
both in the short and long terms” (Fetherston, 2000). But on a positive note, although 
the literature as a whole remains largely descriptive and prescriptive, the latest wave of 
works on peacekeeping has matured considerably, and perhaps, most significant much 
more methodologically rigorous (Fortna & Howard, 2008). 
 
Peacekeeping is the use of non-confrontational military methods that differ from peace 
enforcement which falls under conflict prevention through conflict suppression and 
monitoring coercive methods (Onumajuru, 2005). Although peacekeeping is not 
mentioned in the UN Charter, many theorists describe it as falling between Chapter VI 
and Chapter VII. Peacekeeping operations have been described by Hammarskjold as 
“Chapter 6½ initiatives” (cited in Onumajuru, 2005). 
 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter deals with peace agreements of conflicts while Chapter 
VII relates to actions that need to be taken where there is threat to peace, breaches of 
peace and acts of war. Both form the norms and principles on which the Security 
Council acts (Nkiwane, 2001). Nkiwane notes that conceptually, collective security 
depends on unanimity, especially on the description of aggression and consensus on 
the course of action to be taken. Collective security depends on the agreement 
regarding political and military action (Nkiwane, 2001).  
 
The principles of UN Peacekeeping include that the mission should be established after 
an agreement among the warring parties. And peacekeeping operations should be 
controlled by the secretary-general (cited in Onumajuru, 2005). UN peacekeeping acts 
as a third party exercise whose effort is to bring peace in a conflict situation where an 






received consent from the parties that are in conflict, pre-determined ceasefire deal and 
rules for the non-use of force by the peacekeeping team (Onumajuru, 2005).  
 
Pretoria has followed the above UN principles in engaging in peacekeeping missions. 
Its White Paper on Peace Missions stipulates that the mandate for the peace mission 
must be agreed to among the UN, regional bodies (where applicable), the host country 
and conflicting parties and contributing countries (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998). 
 
Adebajo states that chances for successful peacekeeping are greater when the 
interests and motivations of key actors align (cited in Klick, 2013). This has been true of 
South Africa’s interventions in peace mission in the continent. For instance in the case 
of the Burundi mediation, after spending two years in an attempt to persuade Burundi 
rebels to embrace negotiation with Burundi Transitional Government, Zuma’s efforts 
bore fruit in 2003 (Miti, 2013). 
 
While multilateralism intervention in conflict was already taking place before the 20th 
century, the first professionally planned intervention to deal with security concerns was 
the League of Nations’ effort in 1920. The league punished nations that failed to comply 
with peaceful means to resolve conflict. The punishment included economic, military 
and political sanctions (Diehl, 1988). And although peacekeeping was established 
during the Cold War, its use became prolific only after the Cold War between the 
superpowers ended (Dunderdale, 2013) and (Fortna & Howard, 2008). 
 
The UN asserts that peacekeeping operations often fall into one of the two 
classifications depending on the seriousness of the situation. In instances where the 
conflict is still fairly under control, the UN may use observer operations involving the 
posting of UN staff in the area on a semi-permanent basis to oversee the ceasefire and 
settlement and conduct probes of any grievances of violations. If full scale aggressions 
have erupted, army operations may be required to stop the fighting and keep the peace 






A vital requirement of a peacekeeping exercise is that the participants in the mission 
must not be biased towards either of the parties in dispute. Historically, armies from 
non-aligned nations were deployed to ensure neutrality. Two rules for selecting armies 
for peacekeeping have cropped up over the years. One of them is not to allow troops 
from a country in the conflict to take part in the peacekeeping. The second is not to 
allow armies from major power nations or their allies to be part of the operation. These 
rules are aimed at ensuring that parties involved in the dispute will see the operation as 
neutral, and make conditions conducive to a positive outcome (Diehl, 1988).  
 
Fetherston’s outlook on peacekeeping is not optimistic, as she notes that even with the 
growth of peacekeeping, the increase of multi-dimensional missions and more 
structured involvement, particularly in polls, peacekeeping has not resulted in creating 
long-term sustainable peace. It has not necessarily created opportunities for the 
establishment of conflict resolution. Fetherston even argues that peacekeeping, in some 
cases, has not improved the conflict situation (Fetherston, 2000). 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the research method used to conduct this study. It explained the 
relevance of the qualitative research for this study, and discussed the descriptive and 
explanatory methods which were used to investigate Pretoria’s peace diplomacy. This 
section also elaborated on how the researcher used Bailey’s research process to 
choose the research problem and define the hypothesis, formulate the research design, 
gather, analyse and interpret the data. This chapter also presented the overview of the 
international relations theories, idealism and realism, peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution. These theories offer a theoretical model from which Pretoria’s foreign policy 
was examined.  
 
Having examined international relations theories, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, 









This chapter begins with the discussion of South Africa’s foreign policy before 
democracy. This will help the reader understand why the minority government’s foreign 
policy impacted on Pretoria’s peace diplomacy after 1994. One of the instruments 
Pretoria is now using to engage in peace diplomacy in the continent is multilateralism. 
This section of the study also examines South Africa contribution in organisations such 
as the UN, AU, SADC, and the Nepad Agency. The latter part of this chapter analyses 
Pretoria’s mediation in Zimbabwe, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire and the Republic of Congo. 
 
4.2 South African Foreign Policy Before 1994 
The apartheid government’s behaviour towards other African countries, especially its 
neighbours, was aggressive (Olivier, 2006). The minority government terrorised other 
African nations as South Africa was the economic and military powerhouse not only of 
southern Africa but the whole African continent. One of the reasons South Africa 
attacked African nations was that some of these countries had welcomed political exiles 
who often launched attacks against the minority government. As a result, countries such 
as Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana bore the brunt of the South African 
government’s ire as it destroyed their infrastructure and killed many people. Pretoria 
justified these brutal attacks with claims that its armed forces were fighting the liberation 
enemies of the state (Baynham & Mills, 1994). That behaviour turned the apartheid 
regime into a bully of Africa (Prah, 2013). 
 
However, events such as the Sharpeville massacre, the killing of Soweto students on 
June 16, 1976 and the Rivonia Trial also put South Africa in an awkward place in the 






state because of these tragedies (Pfister, 2006). By the end of PW Botha’s presidency, 
Pretoria was one of the most frowned upon governments in the world because of its 
apartheid policy and as a result, Pretoria lost many friends (Machesa, 1997) and (Alden 
& Le Pere, 2006). South Africa was punished with a wide range of sanctions and 
eventually was suspended by the United Nations and forced to withdraw from the 
Commonwealth (Permanent Mission of SA to the UN, 2011) and (O’Malley, undated). 
Some of the offences for which South Africa was punished with sanctions was Pretoria’s 
intensified “repeated acts of aggression against Angola and Zambia” (Geldenhuys, 
1984). For more than 40 years, South Africa was isolated by the majority of member 
nations of the United Nations (Spence, 2001). 
 
Pretoria was also chastised in the UN over the treatment of the Indian minority and 
South West Africa. The Indian government backed a resolution condemning South 
Africa for denying human rights to its Indian community, an offence New Delhi said was 
harming relations between South Africa and India. The apartheid government denied 
that it had violated basic human rights. In the case of South West Africa, South Africa 
tried to hide behind the legalistic defence of its position but failed to stop criticism 
(Barber & Barratt, 1990). 
 
Baynham and Mills point out that although the UN had for a long time put pressure on 
South Africa over its racial policies, it was not until 1976-78 that the call for sanctions 
against Pretoria intensified. In 1977, a UN resolution dealt with South Africa’s acts of 
violence and killings of African people. The world body declared that Pretoria’s policies 
were “fraught with danger” to international peace and security and South Africa’s 
procurement of arms was a threat to world peace (Baynham & Mills, 1994). Pretoria did 
not take international pressure lying down. The Nationalist Party used its foreign policy 
to fight the international campaign to abolish apartheid (Siko, 2014).  
 
But the world had not always been hard on the white minority government. When the 






apartheid and its evils. “Sovereign independence and the rise of Afrikaner nationalism 
saw apartheid becoming an institutionalised national creed without encountering much 
international resistance” (Olivier, 2006). It was only when countries such as India and 
Pakistan raised the alarm on South Africa’s racial policy in the UN that other nations 
started to condemn Pretoria (Olivier, 2006).  
 
Until 1945, the international law was concerned with states and their relationship with 
other states. After WWII, that changed as a result of human rights abuses committed by 
the, Nazis. “This experience compelled statesmen to accept the need for the new world 
order in which the state was no longer free to treat its own nationals as it pleased” 
(Youla, 2009). 
 
Pfister, Olivier, Spence, and Alden and Le Pere, agree that Pretoria’s foreign policy 
makers were pre-occupied with trying to stop further isolation and convincing whoever 
cared to listen that all was well in South Africa. This obviously failed dismally because 
the ANC led an international campaign to expose the atrocities that were committed 
against the country’s oppressed (Alden & le Pere, 2004), (Pfister, 2006), (Olivier, 2006) 
and (Spence, 2001).  
 
In 1990, the ANC had 28 diplomatic offices overseas whose mission was to campaign 
for support for Pretoria’s isolation (Mills, 1997). The liberation movement worked 
tirelessly to tell the world about the effects of the white minority government’s racial 
policy. Political organisations believed that the world body would support oppressed 
South Africans because of its Charter’s commitment to equality and justice (Youla, 
2009). 
 
However, the case of South Africa was a Catch 22 situation. As the white minority 
government became an outcast, other nations realised that sidelining Pretoria was not 
in the best interest of the Western powers. Despite the fact that apartheid was 






West. Pretoria was vital in counteracting communism and South Africa’s propaganda 
exploited Western fear (History Online, undated). 
 
“The Nationalists effectively played up the communist threat to South Africa from the 
Soviet-backed ANC to maintain consistently high levels of domestic support and win 
anti-Communist friends abroad” (Siko, 2014). South Africa used every tactic it could find 
– legalistic means, diplomatic overtures and economic incentives to entice friends and 
rebuff opponents (Siko, 2014). However, as the circle of international friends narrowed, 
Pretoria turned to the Far East because South Africa’s political reforms were not high in 
those countries’ foreign policy agenda (Thomas, 1994).  
 
South Africa’s attempt at détente to woo African countries failed even before it got off 
the ground. Prime minister John Voster’s intervention in Angola between 1975 and 1976 
was meant to persuade the US and African countries, which were opposed to Cuba-
Soviet influence in Angola, to stand with South Africa. Pretoria got a rude shock when it 
discovered that African countries were unwilling to back a white regime which claimed 
to defend an African neighbouring state against communist influence (South African 
Democracy Education Trust, 2006). 
 
4.3 South Africa’s Multilateralism 
Judging from the history of the apartheid government’s foreign relations with the 
continent, it is clear why the democratic government had to find a constructive manner 
through which it would work with the rest of the African continent.  
 
Pretoria has resorted to multilateralism to participate in solving the continent’s 
economic, political and developmental problems. Kagwanja agrees with this move as he 
points out that as a strategy of power, peace in a multilateral approach has increasingly 
enabled nations to participate and even intervene in other nations’ civil conflicts without 






(Kagwanja, 2006). Multilateral relations enables South Africa to influence the 
programmes and policies of its African counterparts without seeming to be domineering 
(McGurk, 2013).  
 
Mandela said in his early years of presidency that South Africa had to work through 
multilateral organisations, pointing out that these bodies were central to promoting 
peace, equality and human rights, (Barber, 2005). As such, Pretoria’s peacekeeping 
missions and mediation have taken place under the mandates of organisations such as 
the UN, AU, SADC, Non-Aligned Movement, G77 and others (Mabera & Dunne, 2013).  
 
South Africa’s significant participation in multilateralism took place during Mbeki’s 
presidency. Mandela’s successor realised that he could use multilateralism to push for 
Pretoria’s foreign policy position through working under multilateral organisations, 
especially in the continent. From 2000, the Mbeki administration aggressively embarked 
on beefing up Africa’s multilateral institutions, specifically the SADC and AU. It was also 
during Mbeki’s presidency that South Africa played a vital role in the UN (Kagwanja, 
2009).  
 
Mbeki led the campaign to transform political institutions such as the UN Security 
Council, championed the revamp of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to become 
the AU. He also led the call for the transformation of institutions such as the IMF, World 
Bank and World Trade Organisation. These efforts were aimed at ensuring that Africa 
had a voice in these institutions (Landsberg, 2012b). The following section explores 
Pretoria’s performance in the AU, SADC, UN and Nepad Agency, and how that has 
helped South Africa contribute to peace diplomacy. 
 
(a) African Union 
South Africa joined the OAU in 1994 and chaired the AU from June 2002 to June 2003. 






played a vital role in the establishment of the AU’s institutions, policies and procedures 
(Landsberg, 2009). 
 
Pretoria is one of the biggest financial contributors to the AU’s budget (it was 
contributing 15% of the funds of the African body in 2011), and pays as much as  
R30 million to the Nepad Agency and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
(Landsberg, 2009) and (Nepad, 2011a).  
 
Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, one of Pretoria’s former senior cabinet ministers, was 
appointed as the AU Commission’s chairperson in July 2012. However, Pretoria drew 
criticism from African leaders and analysts for pursuing its ambitions in the AU (Handy 
cited in Bradfield, 2013), (Habib, 2012) and (Naidoo, 2012). The observers were 
referring to Pretoria’s aggressive campaigning for the election of Dlamini Zuma as 
chairperson of the union. Key priorities for her term include greater internal efficiency 
and effectiveness within the AU Commission as an executing agency of the AU 
(Presidency, 2014).  
 
South Africa’s involvement with the AU has primarily focused on a number of issues. 
Pretoria has concentrated on promoting the AU as Africa’s institution of governance and 
development. The aim is that the AU must spearhead the promotion of healthy 
governance in the continent, so as to promote Africa’s renewal agenda (Presidency, 
2014).  
 
South Africa has helped establish and bolster the AU Commission to implement 
decisions which have been made by the AU Assembly and the AU Council. Pretoria has 
also been hosting the Pan African Parliament since 2005, the Nepad Agency and 
APRM Secretariat since 2001 and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy. The AU 
established the Pan-African Parliament so that it increased its public accountability and 
access to the ordinary Africans. The parliament represents all elected African national 






this body, saying it still needed to be strengthened to become more politically effective 
(Mbeki, 2012). 
 
Pretoria supported the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), 
which, among other responsibilities, deploys peacekeeping missions. South Africa is 
also contributing to capacity building by training diplomats and other civil servants from 
the continent (Presidency, 2014). 
 
(b) Southern African Development Community 
SADC’s precursor, Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference, was 
established in 1980 to fight South Africa’s apartheid. So, to forge good relations with its 
neighbours, it made sense for the post-apartheid state to put southern Africa at the top 
of its foreign relations agenda. This demonstrated Pretoria’s commitment to all aspects 
of SADC agenda, including political, social and economic issues of the region 
(Saurombe, 2010).  
 
Pretoria showed the prominence it attached to the region by adopting its first foreign 
policy document called a “Framework for Co-operation in Southern Africa” which got the 
green light from the cabinet as early as August 1996 (Department of Foreign Affairs, 
2003). 
 
Since 1994, South Africa has led the way in the region in addressing issues such as 
closer collaboration and economic integration. These include the establishment of a  
free trade area in the region, the development of basic infrastructure, the advancement 
of human resources and promotion of peace, democracy and good governance in  
the region. Although southern Africa has looked to South Africa as a pacesetter in 
SADC’s peace agenda, Saurombe points out that, in the process, Pretoria has tended 
to bully its regional partners. South Africa attempts to wield its economic power when 






It was Mbeki’s government which made a significant contribution to the SADC. His 
foreign policy pertaining to the SADC was centred on three basic considerations: to 
keep the organisation unified, resolve institutional challenges in SADC within the 
organisation’s framework and, where applicable, to employ other multilateral tools to 
use Pretoria’s conflict resolution strategy (Alden, 2002). The second president of the 
democratic government also introduced a conciliatory tone that leaned towards quiet 
diplomacy and consensus building between SADC member states (Alden, 2002). 
 
Pretoria has also recorded a number of achievements in the SADC. Pretoria was 
instrumental in the establishment of the Berlin Initiative, whose aim is to promote closer 
co-operation between the European Union and SADC. Among issues that the initiative 
aims to deal with is the strengthening of democracy in southern Africa, clearance of 
landmines and promoting trade and investment (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2003). 
 
“South Africa chaired SADC’s powerful Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 
2004/05. During its tenure, Pretoria prioritised the linking of SADC’s institutional 
capacity by implementing two initiatives: the15-Year Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan to pursue SADC’s socio-economic goals, and the Strategic Indicative 
Plan for the organ to address political, peace and security priorities ” (Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 2003).  
 
Pretoria was also instrumental in the establishing, together with other SADC member 
states, of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The aim of this organ is to 
provide a forum to debate and resolve political issues. It also aims to achieve “solidarity, 
peace and security within the SADC. The emphasis is on the peaceful settlement of 
disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration” (Department of Foreign 
Affairs, 2003). 
 
But the establishment of the organ has been controversial. Challenges for Pretoria 






on Politics, Defence and Security (Molefi, 2003). The body was paralysed by political 
differences between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Pretoria, supported by Botswana, 
Tanzania and Mozambique, argued that the organ should be a peacemaking body. But 
Zimbabwe, backed by Namibia and Angola, contended that it should be a military-
orientated body which would provide mutual defence.  
 
South Africa was peeved when Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola led the SADC to 
intervene militarily in the DRC to crush Rwandan and Ugandan forces. South Africa 
opposed this move because Mandela’s government had been already mediating in the 
DRC crisis (Bah, 2004). 
 
South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 also aggravated the division 
within the SADC. Some of the SADC member states felt that South Africa was imposing 
its power over smaller countries. Zimbabwe and South Africa tried to use the regional 
organisation to bolster their foreign policy objectives and in the process holding the 
security tool of the organisation hostage (Alden, 2002). 
 
Perhaps, one of the regrets is that Pretoria’s term came to an end without the approval 
of the crucial Mutual Defence Pact created to promote co-operation in defence and 
security matters, which regional leaders agreed upon in August 2003 (Kagwanja, 2009).  
 
(c) United Nations 
While South Africa was lauded for becoming a non-permanent member of the UN 
Security Council (UNSC), Pretoria was condemned for the way it voted in the council. 
After a first term which was marred by controversy in 2007-2008, South Africa got 
another chance to serve a second term on the UNSC in 2011-2012. Pretoria came 
under fire for opposing the criticism of human rights abuses in Myanmar and Zimbabwe; 
the call for sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme and the inclusion of the 






During its second term, Pretoria’s biggest achievements was the adoption by the UNSC 
of Resolution 2033, which South Africa initiated to formalise, bolster and encourage the 
UNSC’s co-operation with regional organisations, particularly the AU PSC (Government 
Communication, 2014).  
Sangqu commended South Africa for leading the Working Group on Conflict Prevention 
and Resolution in Africa, a forum which aimed to find ways to prevent and resolve 
conflicts in the continent and the 1540 Committee, which stops non-state actors from 
accumulating arms of mass killings. Pretoria also supported the ground-breaking council 
resolutions on consolidating the strategic co-operation between the AU and the UN 
Security Council in Resolution 2033 and also promoted its positions with regards to the 
rule of law at national and international levels, post-conflict development, peace and 
security. South Africa also championed a Security Council Mission to Africa and led a 
fact-finding mission of the Council to Timor-Leste in 2012. (cited in South African 
Government News Agency, 2013). 
However, a vote pertaining to the Libyan crisis drew a barrage of criticism against 
Pretoria. This came after South Africa backed the UN Resolution 1973 imposing a no- 
fly zone over Libya while Pretoria’s Brics partners, Russia and China, refrained. The 
UN’s motion was authorising the Nato attack on Libya during the Arab Spring (Mashele, 
2012), (Pillay, 2011) and (Petré, 2011).  
South Africa voted with France, US and Britain, Gabon and Nigeria in favour of 
Resolution 1973. Pretoria was slammed for supporting a UN decision to bomb Libya 
ignoring the AU’s suggestion for mediation between Gaddafi and the rebels (Miti, 2013). 
Five heads of state were still holding talks on the Libyan crisis in Mauritania when they 
received news that Nato had started bombing Gaddafi’s positions. Seeing its mistake 
Pretoria made a U-turn. President Zuma criticised the West for diverging from the goal 
of Resolution 1973, which authorised a no-fly zone to protect civilians. He accused Nato 






But Habib differs from the critics of South Africa’s Libya vote. He opines that Pretoria 
was right in condemning the attempt by the US, Britain and France to move beyond the 
mandate of Resolution. The only strategic mistake was that the political intervention 
should have happened at the point of the stand-off in Benghazi and should have been 
launched through the AU. (Habib, 2012). 
 
But Pretoria was accused of another policy contradiction when it abstained in the vote to 
condemn human rights violations in Syria. Three months later South Africa voted in 
favour of a UN resolution calling for Syrian president to vacate the office (Landsberg, 
2012b). The difference between Zuma’s and Mbeki’s foreign policies has been in the 
way they voted in the UN. While Mbeki’s government was consistent in abstaining in 
voting concerning countries such as Zimbabwe, Iran and Myanmar, Zuma’s 
controversial voting behaviour was seen in issues such as those of Syria and Libya 
(Landsberg, 2012a). 
 
(d) Nepad Agency 
Nepad was born from Mbeki’s conceptualisation of the African Renaissance discussed 
in Chapter 5. Launched in 2001, Nepad is a socio-economic development scheme 
designed to encourage African countries to take charge of protecting principles of 
democracy and good governance through the APRM (SouthAfrica.info Reporter, 2006).  
 
Nepad became a foreign policy in essence, guiding Pretoria’s dealings with other 
African countries. Principles that guide Nepad include economic development that 
results from promoting capitalism and political stability and peace and security 
(Dassah, 2009) and (Okokpari, 2004). It was initiated by heads of five African states – 
South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and Senegal. The strategic framework of Nepad 
was adopted by the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government during the 
37th Summit of the Organisation of African Unity in July 2001. Its General Secretariat is 






Killander argues that Nepad should be credited, although partly, for putting democracy 
and good governance at the top of Africa’s development agenda and placing Africa’s 
development challenges at the top of the EU’s external relations agenda (cited in 
Obonye, 2012). 
 
Nepad birthed the APRM, which, despite criticism and implementation difficulties, 
remains a novel tool for building democracy and good governance and is an instrument 
that can be copied by other regions (Paterson, 2012). An expert states: “This 
mechanism is an initiative by African leaders which is supposed to be people-centred, 
people-owned, people-managed, and people-driven” (cited in Obonye, 2012). Nepad’s 
other successes include the formulation of a framework to restructure capacity 
development across Africa and the digitisation of the Timbuktu Manuscripts, aimed at 
preserving them (Nepad, 2011b).  
 
Like many initiatives, Nepad has shortcomings. According to Kavei, Nepad lacks 
effective co-ordination between and among its many components, partners and projects 
(cited in Obonye, 2012). There is also the overlapping of roles and functions between 
the AU and Nepad. This is seen in the AU PSC and the APRM which both oversee the 
protection of democracy and good governance (Fombad, 2006). 
 
Legwaila argues that weak institutional capacity limits progress in the execution of 
Nepad at continental, regional and national levels. The problems result in technical 
capacity in executing programmes, insufficient financial capacity and inadequately 
developed guidelines to manage collective action (cited in Obonye, 2012).  
 
According to Obonye, the head of state-centered Nepad has the capability of enslaving 
Africans all over again, therefore, denying the continent the chance of pulling itself out 
of its socio-economic and political abyss. Conflicts in countries such as the DRC, Mali, 
Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Guinea and Madagascar have been a setback for Nepad’s bid 






4.4 How has South Africa Fared in Peace Diplomacy in Africa?  
South Africa’s peace diplomacy has grown considerably since the ANC government 
took office. Pretoria’s record of its peace diplomacy is mixed, but it shows notable 
successes (Sidiropoulos, 2007). Miti concurs as he says: “What is important is that 
there has been a willingness and political commitment to address the continental 
conflicts and national resources have been committed to this end” (Miti, 2013).  
 
From 1999-2014, Pretoria participated in 14 peace missions, as it continued to prioritise 
efforts to bring peace and security in the continent. South African troops have served in 
UN and AU missions in countries such as Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, the DRC, 
Sudan, Comoros and Liberia (Government Communication, 2014), (Ebrahim, 2014), 
(Van Nieuwkerk, 2013), (Tjemolane, 2014) and (Salifu, 2010). Marthoz lauds Pretoria’s 
progress in international relations, so far. He points out that having taken an important 
role in forging a new international order, especially in Africa, Pretoria has played a 
leading role as a peacekeeper and peacemaker in the region (Marthoz, 2012). 
 
Although Pretoria has been engaged in peace missions in many African countries, the 
section below discusses its peace diplomacy in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe and 
the DRC. Chief mediators for the Burundi conflict were Mandela and Zuma, DRC (Mbeki 
and Zuma), Cote d’Ivoire (Mbeki and Zuma) and Zimbabwe (Mbeki and Zuma).  
 
(a) Burundi Peace Mission 
South Africa began to engage in the Burundian peace process when Mandela was 
commissioned by a regional summit in Arusha to lead mediation in that country (Vrey & 
Rautenbac, 2010) and (IRIN Humanitarian Information Unit, 1999). Mandela, who 
started leading this mediation process after he had just retired as the president of South 
Africa, became the obvious facilitator after Julius Nyerere, the mediator in the Burundi 






The former Tanzanian president and Mandela had been friends for a long time. The 
South African president had supported Nyerere to act as facilitator in the Burundi’s 
peace process. As a result, Nyerere often consulted Mandela during his time of 
mediation (Pillai, 2009). Even way before these talks, in 1994, Nyerere had urged the 
post-apartheid government to “commit to resolving the tangled humanitarian crises of 
the Great Lakes region” (Pillai, 2009). 
 
It was likely that after Nyerere’s death, the Burundi peace mission would have collapsed 
if Mandela did not take over later that year. He used a lot of moral pressure in the 
Burundi mediation, but with his experience, was able to do so “authentically and 
efficiently” (Mason, 2008). The reasons Mandela’s leadership was helpful is that, first, 
the South African icon and post-apartheid government enjoyed the credibility that 
resulted from South Africa’s democratic transition from apartheid. Second, the country’s 
growing “African superpower” status, its apparent disinterest and Mandela’s own 
international status were crucial in leading the Burundi peace process (Mthembu-Salter, 
Berger, & Kikoler, 2011). 
 
South Africa had no intentions of engaging in the Burundi peace mission. But the 
mission gave Pretoria an opportunity to give concrete meaning to the implementation of 
its foreign policy in Africa, as advocated by Mbeki (Vrey & Rautenbac, 2010). Mandela’s 
involvement in the Burundian peace mission gave Pretoria a chance to show its 
commitment to Africa. Burundi lacked sought-after resources, which are often thought to 
be the motive behind interventions in the continent. All Burundi needed was help to halt 
a conflict that had claimed thousands of lives. The country was physically far from South 
Africa and there was thus no direct interest, except the strategic interest to help a fellow 
African nation on the road to stability (Vrey & Rautenbac, 2010). 
 
Bentley and Southall state that Mandela’s mediation strategy included addressing the 






attention. This forced Burundians to face the issue of ethnicity more honestly, an aspect 
that was crucial because it focused the mediation process on seeking ethnic power-
sharing solutions, such as the idea of the presidency rotating between Tutsi and Hutu 
(cited in Pillai, 2009). 
 
The contribution that Mandela, in particular, made to solve the Burundi problem came 
not only from a peacekeeping formula he learned from the negotiations to end conflict in 
South Africa, but also resulted from his skill as a negotiator and his shrewdness at 
getting to the heart of the matter and forcing a way through the key blockages that were 
preventing progress (Freund, 2006). 
 
Security for leaders who had left the country was a concern for the mediators. To 
address this issue, Mandela sought help from relevant South African departments to 
mandate the deployment of the South African Protection Support Detachment in 
October 2000, to provide protection to returning leaders (Agoagye, 2004). 
 
At the initial stage of the peace process, Mandela allowed the committees to work 
together, and then applied pressure to get a deal on the open issues (Mason, 2008). He 
suggested five priorities as a means to eradicate hindrances in the committee 
negotiations: assurance of security which would encourage peace and reconciliation; 
incorporation of Hutu rebel fighters into the army rather than civil society, so that the 
ethnic composition of the army could be transformed; the addressing of the thorny 
issues before elections are held; the establishment of a transitional regime which would 
be in place, at least, for five years and addressing of the property rights for returning 
refugees (Pillai, 2009). 
 
Mandela invited the parties to a signing ceremony in August 2000 although some had 
not agreed to key provisions in the provisional document nor was there a deal on who 
would lead the transitional government or a truce with the rebels. This move worked: 14 






parties into a plan from which peace would flourish. Later Mandela also broke the 
stalemate over the transitional leadership as he declared that Pierre Buyoya would 
remain the president for the first half of the transition period (Curtis, 2007b). 
 
But much bigger problems remained. The Arusha Accord was signed without a 
ceasefire. And two main rebel Hutu parties, Paliphehutu-FNL and the National Council 
for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy refused to take 
part in the peace process (Miti, 2013) and (Pillai, 2009). Although Mandela 
acknowledged those setbacks, he believed that the signing of the accord even without a 
ceasefire would provide a new impetus for the peace process and would put pressure 
on the militants to join the truce bid (Miti, 2013).  
 
After the signing of the Arusha Accord, Mandela withdrew from the talks and Mbeki, 
who had become South Africa’s president, assigned (deputy president) Zuma to take 
over the mediation process in 2001. The implementation of the Arusha Accord would 
not have been possible without the continued engagement of the South African 
government. The reason is that Pretoria did not only provide military staff to ensure a 
peaceful transition but also continued to foot the bill for the negotiations of a ceasefire 
agreement between the government and the armed groups. Zuma had to oversee 
outstanding issues in the Arusha agreements which had been signed by Mandela in 
2000 (Miti, 2013). 
 
The biggest challenge Zuma faced was to get Burundi’s warring groups to the 
negotiating table. It took two years for the rebels and the transitional government to 
reach a deal on two power-sharing issues (Miti, 2013).  
 
Zuma’s mediation method was different from the strategies that were followed by 
Nyerere and Mandela. He was discrete in his bid and he also directly involved the AU 
and the UN in the Burundi peace negotiations. He realised early that Burundi rebels’ 






region. So, they were backed by some of the governments in the region. That is why he 
sought support from the international community to bring peace in Burundi. Regional 
leaders and Zuma concentrated on mediation for a new constitution. During this 
process, Zuma and the other mediators opposed attempts by Tutsi parties to reject key 
aspects of the constitution in addition to attempts of President Domitien Ndayizeye, 
Buyoya’s successor, to amend the constitution to postpone the electoral process 
(Khadiagala cited in Pillai, 2009). 
  
Pretoria’s peace mission in Burundi, which included diplomatic, political and military 
involvement, was successful. South Africa’s role in the Burundian peace mediation was 
key to the success of the resolution of the conflict (Pillay, 2013).  
 
(b) Cote d’Ivoire Peace Mission 
Cote d’Ivoire plunged into civil war in 2002, after confrontations between insurgents 
from the north of the country and forces loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo. This had led 
to a division of the country into north and south (Rametsi, 2006). Mbeki was assigned 
by the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) to mediate a 
peace settlement in Cote d’Ivoire in November 2004. Such a decision seemed sensible 
because South Africa chaired the Peace and Security Council of the AU at the time. 
Besides, there was belief that the involvement of a plausible third party from outside 
West Africa was crucial to resolving problems in Cote d’Ivoire (Rametsi, 2006). Pillai 
states that Mbeki’s participation in the Accra talks also automatically put him in a 
position to facilitate in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis (Pillai, 2009). 
 
The conflict had erupted in Cote d’Ivoire when New Forces rebels staged an uprising 
against Gbagbo, virtually dividing the country into a Muslim-dominated rebel north and 
Christian government-held south (Mantu, 2005). The New Forces is a coalition that had 
been formed in December 2002 after the signing of Côte d’Ivoire’s first peace accords. 






claimed the lives of nine French soldiers and one American non-governmental 
organisation official, and many Ivoirians (Williams, 2006).  
 
When Mbeki became involved in the Cote d’Ivoire crisis, peace efforts, namely the 
Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords and Accra II and III, which were led by France and 
Ecowas, had collapsed (Rametsi, 2006). Mbeki’s key role was to secure the 
amendment of Article 35 of the Constitution, which would resolve a deadlock caused by 
Gbagbo’s attempt to prevent his key counterparts from contesting the election against 
him, particularly Alassane Ouattara – who had formed a strong alliance with another 
leader, Konan Bedie. Mbeki succeeded in convincing Laurent and Simone Gbagbo and 
Mamadou Koulibally that the New Forces would disarm if this amendment was made 
(Williams, 2006). 
The five leaders, Gbagbo, Prime Minister Seydou Diarra, New Forces rebel leader 
Guillaume Soro, and Cote d’Ivoire’s main opposition politicians, Bedie and Ouattara, 
signed what became known as the Tshwane (Pretoria) Agreement. They agreed to 
continue the peace process to resolve some of the outstanding issues of the Linas-
Marcoussis, Accra II and III agreements (Mantu, 2005). 
Mbeki emphasised the need for Ecowas and AU to work together to bring peace in Cote 
d’Ivoire (Dadson, 2008). The Pretoria I and II agreements, signed on April 6, 2005 and 
June 29 of the same year were a result of this joint effort. The Pretoria agreements 
sought to address outstanding issues of disarmament and dismantling of the network of 
rebels based throughout the country who undermined the implementation of Linas-
Marcoussis agreements. The failure to address these issues led to the signing of 
another deal known as the Declaration on the Implementation of the Pretoria Peace 
Agreement (Dadson, 2008). Among other issues that were introduced was that the AU 
should impose sanctions on a party that failed to comply with the implementation of the 
agreement. Up until this point, the rebel leader Soro “had given up on African mediation 






the mediators had taken and called on France and the UN to mediate the peace 
process” (Dadson, 2008). 
 
Two years later, however, Pretoria faced criticism from the New Forces which charged 
that Mbeki supported Gbagbo and called for the replacement of the South African 
president as a facilitator (Pillai, 2009). Gbagbo, on the other hand, commended Mbeki 
for succeeding in respecting the positions of all sides (Rametsi, 2006). In October 2006, 
during an AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa, Mbeki announced 
Pretoria’s intention to pull out from the mediation in Côte d’Ivoire. The reason for that 
decision, he said, was that South Africa wanted to avoid conflict of interest because 
Pretoria was on the verge of assuming the non-permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council (Pillai, 2009). While the appointment of Mbeki brought fresh momentum to the 
deadlocked talks between the New Forces and the Gbagbo government, very little 
progress was made (Miti, 2013).  
 
Zuma found himself again facilitating the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire after he 
became president in 2009. At that time the conflict was centred on the results of the 
polls of October/November 2010. These polls were expected to bring peace after the 
conflict that had divided the country into two. The Electoral Commission and the UN 
representatives announced that Ouattara had won the second round against Gbagbo. 
The Constitutional Council, on the other hand, declared Gbagbo the winner of the 
election. The double results led to each leader being sworn in as president of Cote 
d’Ivoire (Miti, 2013). Observers called for the removal of the incumbent, a move that 
Zuma condemned. Instead, he said, to resolve the impasse, parties had to promote 
reconciliation and national unity. This was interpreted as support for Gbagbo, an 
accusation that had been levelled against Mbeki (Miti, 2013). 
 
While many observers felt that South Africa’s mediation in Cote d’Ivoire was a fiasco, 
Pillai blames strong opposition from West African countries and the New Forces for 






The AU asked Mbeki to help resolve the Côte d’Ivoire presidential dispute after the 2010 
elections (Sapa, 2010). When this effort also failed, Mbeki said: “You will not have 
peace without democracy, and neither democracy without peace” (RFI, 2010). 
 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s chief of staff, Vijay Nambiar, declared that 
Pretoria’s mediation in Cote d’Ivoire had failed. In 2011, Mbeki blamed the UN for 
declaring Ouattara the winner of the elections. This move, Mbeki said, was against the 
AU’s belief that the solution of the Ivorian crisis depended on a negotiated settlement 
between the two belligerent factions. The AU believed that such a settlement would 
bring democracy, peace, national reconciliation and unity. Nambiar rejected this, saying 
forcing Ouattara to negotiate a power-sharing deal would have undermined the choice 
of the voters (Charbonneau, 2011). It took the intervention of the France, not Africans, 
to force Gbagbo out of power (Patel, 2012). 
 
(c) Zimbabwe Peace Mission 
The crisis in Zimbabwe goes back to February 2000 constitutional referendum which 
sought among other things to allow for land confiscation without compensation (unless 
financed by Britain); increase of the powers of the head of state and extension of 
Mugabe’s term in office for 12 more years (Miti, 2013). 
 
Even before that, some Zimbabweans had voiced disquiet over the developing political 
affairs in the country. Consequently a new movement was born in 1999 – the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) – to challenge the new draft constitution. The MDC 
defeated the governing party in a referendum on draft constitution. This defeat, 
however, sparked the violent invasion of white farms by the war veterans, attacks which 
were overlooked by the state. After chaotic elections which were also marred by 
violence in 2002, Mugabe was declared the winner (Miti, 2013).  
 
Mbeki started peace diplomacy in Zimbabwe after South Africa’s neighbour had been 





Zimbabwe’s political and economic problems and tried as much as he could to convince 
the UK, US and other Western countries that if the land issue could be resolved by 
providing funding for compensation of the acquired white farms, things could go back to 
normal” (Miti, 2013). 
 
Throughout the crisis, Mbeki rejected the use of sanctions against Zimbabwe. He urged 
the West to lift sanctions against South Africa’s neighbour, saying they were used as a 
tool for regime change (Nyathi, 2012).  
 
Mbeki’s government opted for quiet diplomacy – as a policy approach to help resolve 
the political crisis in Zimbabwe (Mkhize, 2008). Quiet diplomacy, a form of traditional 
diplomacy involving negotiators acting behind closed doors, out of the spotlight of the 
media, was aimed at encouraging dialogue between the Zimbabwe African National 
Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) and the opposition. South Africa’s quiet diplomacy 
promoted the idea of Zimbabweans dealing with their issues without the interference of 
outsiders (Mkhize, 2008). 
 
Barber believed the Harare crisis became the hardest problem for Mbeki’s government 
(Barber, 2005). As the international community screamed for harsh intervention against 
Mugabe, the Mbeki government never succumbed to the pressure of critics of South 
Africa’s peace diplomacy in Zimbabwe (Chidozie, Agbude, & Oni, 2013).  
 
Many observers condemned Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy for its slow pace in a crisis that 
seemed to slide Zimbabwe into chaos (Townsend & Copson, 2005). In return Pahad 
lashed out at those who opposed quiet diplomacy, saying they did not offer any credible 
alternatives on how South Africa should help bring peace in Zimbabwe. For instance, 
Pahad said, the critics had failed to show what megaphone diplomacy had 
accomplished. He said many naysayers refused to see that Pretoria had worked hard to 
assist Zimbabweans to resolve the crisis (cited in Chidozie, Agbude & Oni, 2013). 






able to persuade Mugabe to stop the chaos in South Africa’s neighbour (Townsend & 
Copson, 2005). 
 
Mbeki’s diplomacy in Zimbabwe was based on the premise that keeping lines of 
communication with Mugabe was important in bringing peace in Zimbabwe. Mbeki did 
not care how other leaders treated Mugabe, but he was convinced that his approach to 
solve the Zimbabwe’s crisis was going to produce results no matter how long it took 
(Landsberg, 2008). 
 
But in all fairness when the conflict in Zimbabwe’s worsened in 2000, state Schoeman 
and Alden, Mbeki was also trying to transform his vision of the African Renaissance into 
what would give birth to the Nepad by the end of 2001. As expected, he was sensitive 
about how Pretoria was seen by the rest of the continent. He desperately needed the 
backing for this new economic initiative (cited in Graham, 2004). 
 
While some observers believed Mbeki employed quiet diplomacy because he was soft 
on Mugabe, others believed there was “no personal affinity between the men” (Siko, 
2014) and (Barber, 2005). In fact, Mugabe thought Mbeki was an arrogant upstart who 
failed to see him as a revered statesman (Barber, 2005). Barber also lists his reasons 
he believes made Mbeki employ quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe: Mugabe is regarded as 
a liberation hero in the African continent. His government took on a fight over land, 
which is a contentious issue among Africans. Mbeki was obsessed with keeping the 
African unity and when the MDC approached South Africa’s opposition leader Leon for 
support, Mbeki’s response was to resort to quiet diplomacy (Barber, 2005). 
 
Graham suggests the following reasons as to why Mbeki chose quiet diplomacy to 
mediate peace in Zimbabwe: post-apartheid government’s second president believed 
the outcry over the crisis came from people who wanted to protect the interests of the 
white Zimbabweans, he needed to prevent a complete breakdown of authority and that 






All in all, progress in Pretoria’s peace diplomacy toward Zimbabwe was slow. Pretoria 
endorsed elections in 2002 and 2005 as free and fair despite different views of local and 
international observers. But Mbeki and his team worked tirelessly throughout his second 
tenure to help resolve Zimbabwe’s political crisis. South Africa, through the SADC, 
condemned the June 2008 second round of the Zimbabwean presidential election as 
not representing the will of the Zimbabwean people. But Pretoria remained committed to 
that country’s peace diplomacy. The elections had been boycotted by the MDC because 
of government intimidation (Siko, 2014).  
 
By 2007, Mbeki had recorded successes in the Zimbabwe peace mediation. These 
included, a draft constitution signed by all parties, an agreement on electoral and 
legislative reforms and a facilitation of conditions that eradicated pre-election violence 
(Coady, 2012). After the 2008 election, Mbeki was mandated by the SADC to facilitate a 
second peace process between Mugabe’s government and the MDC (Miti, 2013). Until 
then, South Africa had participated in the Zimbabwe’s mediation as a member of the 
Commonwealth triad (Australia, Nigeria and South Africa) that was set up to deal with 
the political crisis in that country (Miti, 2013). 
 
Although the South African president had said that his main objective was to ensure 
Zimbabwe held free and fair elections, early in 2008, Mbeki failed to guarantee that 
elections were held in a violence-free environment. In March of the same year, 
Zimbabwe’s talks stalled after the government and the opposition disagreed on the 
election date and constitution. Mbeki conveniently changed his tune – from pursuing 
conditions for free and fair elections to merely mediating between warring parties 
(Coady, 2012). 
 
With an economic meltdown reaching alarming levels, all parties believed that the 
opposition needed to be involved in the negotiations. “It was this changed scenario that 
allowed Mbeki to persuade the antagonists to sign an agreement in September 2008, 






formation of a government of national unity which Mbeki had been pushing for all along” 
(Coady, 2012). 
 
Mbeki’s peace efforts in Zimbabwe were cut short when he left office in 2008 and was 
replaced by (President Kgalema) Motlanthe. When Zuma took office in 2009, he took 
over the task of implementing the GPA (Miti, 2013). Landsberg states that Zuma 
decided to continue with Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe. The analyst points out 
that Zuma left much of the negotiations to his mediation team, unlike Mbeki who was 
hands-on in the peace process in that country (cited in Miti, 2013). 
 
However, Zuma is credited for the successful implementation of the GPA. He put 
pressure on Mugabe to honour his commitments to the GPA, but also showed solidarity 
by calling for the unconditional cancellation of the sanctions against the Zimbabwean 
president and his political associates in the ruling party (Mathye, 2013). 
 
The evaluation of Pretoria’s performance depends on who is assessing South Africa’s 
peace mediation in Zimbabwe. While the SADC fell short of declaring the September 
2013 elections free and fair, preferring rather to pronounce that it was “orderly and 
peaceful” (Lalbahadur, 2014), the Botswana’s election observers pronounced the 2013 
polls as free and peaceful rather than free and fair, the latter being the criteria for 
credible elections. The Botswanan team based its conclusion on the following reasons: 
the voters’ roll was released two days before the elections, there were allegations that 
many people were denied a chance to vote and the inclusion of names of people not 
eligible to vote (Sokwanele, 2013). Dzinesa and Zambara conclude that Pretoria’s 
perceived failure to lead Zimbabwe to credible elections damaged South Africa’s 
credibility as an effective leader (Dzinesa & Zambara , 2011). 
 
But it is important to point out what Pretoria’s mandate was in the mediation in 
Zimbabwe. South Africa’s mediation met the objectives of the SADC which had 






find a solution through a negotiated deal which would be owned by the Zimbabwean 
people. Zuma succeeded in ensuring that provisions were made for Zimbabweans to 
come up with their own solutions. That resulted in a constitution which was accepted by 
Zimbabweans through a referendum. And following that, elections were held on July 31, 
2013 (Mathye, 2013). In fact, the Church of Sweden argues that Pretoria’s mediation in 
Zimbabwe averted an imminent implosion (Church of Sweden, 2013). 
 
The observer mission, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, declared that 
the 2013 elections were free and fair. Contrary to media reports that the poll was 
marred by violence and vote rigging, the team found that “the general atmosphere 
under which the poll was held was peaceful”. It noted that compared with the situation in 
the past two polls, the 2013 elections had improved (Comesa, 2013). 
 
General Olusegun Obasanjo, the former president of Nigeria, who led the AU  
Election Observer team in Zimbabwe, endorsed the election as valid, declaring that 
there had never been a perfect poll. Failure or success should be based on how many 
violations have been reported. Although there were incidents which could have been 
avoided, Obasanjo said his team believed that those incidents would not amount to the 
outcome not revealing the will of the voters. Bernard Membe of Tanzania, who led the 
SADC election observer mission, also gave the election a thumbs-up (Alemayehu, 
2013). 
 
(d) DRC Peace Mission 
Since 1999, Pretoria led efforts to end political violence in the DRC. It hosted the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue (ICD) at Sun City, in February 2002. The ICD borrowed from, the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa, better known as Codesa, whose building 
blocks had helped bring about a political resolution from 1991-1994. However, even 
before that, Pretoria had attempted to broker a deal between Mobutu Sese Seko and 






Pretoria’s role of peacemaker in the DRC bore fruit. Despite continuing violence in the 
East of the DRC, according to Khadigala and Shillinger, the Sun City talks in 2002 and 
the Pretoria agreements of 2002-3 began a growing peace process and opened the 
door to post-war reconstruction of that country (cited in Van Nieuwkerk, 2013). “South 
African personnel continue to make up a large contingent of UN peace support and 
enforcement operations in the DRC. If anything, South Africa now plays a key role as 
interlocutor between the southern and eastern African sub-regions” (Van Nieuwkerk, 
2013). 
 
The negotiations in Sun City and Pretoria resulted in the signing of the Pretoria Peace 
Agreement (Global and All-Inclusive Peace Accord) on December 17, 2002. This, in 
turn, paved the way for the DRC’s first democratic elections in 2006. During these first 
elections, South Africa gave financial and logistical support, which ensured that the 
DRC hosted credible elections. Again in November 2011, South Africa provided critical 
assistance to ensure that the presidential and parliamentary elections continued as 
planned. The SANDF transported 1863 tons of ballot papers and other electoral 
materials from South Africa to the DRC. Pretoria contributed about R126 million to the 
election process in the DRC to ensure that that country strengthens its democracy 
(DRC South African Embassy Kinchasa, undated).  
 
The rebellion in April 2012 of what became known as the 23 March Movement, better 
known as M23, threatened to reverse gains that had been achieved over the years and 
threatened another re-emergence of fighting and distress that had plagued the DRC for 
decades. On February 24, 2013, South Africa joined 10 other African countries, and the 
UN, AU, ICGLR (International Conference on the Great Lakes Region) and SADC, in 
signing the Peace, Security and Co-operation Framework for the DRC and the region. 
The framework spelled out national commitments for the DRC, for the countries of the 
region and for the international community. South Africa is a member of the regional 
oversight mechanism that is tasked with ensuring that the countries of the region adhere 






South African troops have been on the ground in that country, under a number of 
mandates, for 15 years (Allison, 2014). “It is worth noting that when we deployed in the 
DRC, that country had virtually no infrastructure to talk about. Specialist elements such 
as fire-fighters, engineers, and air cargo handlers, the military police were sent in as 
well as medical teams who were able to stabilise the situation. That country’s airport in 
Kinshasa is now one of the busiest in Africa, all because of selfless efforts by our men 
and women in uniform” (Mapisa-Nqakula cited in Allison). 
 
South Africa’s tenacity in mediating peace in the DRC paid off, notes Van Nieuwkerk, 
and Sidiropoulos adds that, “this is without question South Africa’s most important 
achievement” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2013) and (Sidiropoulos, 2007). 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how South Africa’s hostilities destroyed relations with the rest 
of the continent, particularly its neighbours. This section also discussed how 
multilateralism flourished when Mbeki took office and showed how South Africa has 
contributed in organisations such as the AU, SADC and even the UN. Pretoria has not 
only provided home for bodies such as the Nepad Agency and the Pan African 
Parliament, but it is also one of the major financial contributors to a number of regional 
organisations. 
  
This chapter also showed how South Africa has invested vast sums of money and 
human resources in peace diplomacy. The latter part of this chapter examined South 








Analysis of the Results 
5.1 Introduction  
A president’s performance as foreign relations actor is measured by the successes he 
or she achieves during his or her term in office. US president Ronald Reagan is, 
perhaps, regarded as the one president who accomplished many foreign policy 
successes in the United States of America (Crabb & Mulcahy, 1986). Some foreign 
policy observers have sought to make similar comparisons on the performance of South 
African presidents as foreign relations actors. This chapter will outline the influence of 
Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma on Pretoria’s peace diplomacy. Added to that, will be a brief 
analysis of changes on South African foreign policy after 1994, Pretoria’s peace 
diplomacy in the past 20 years, challenges facing Pretoria’s peace diplomacy and a 
theoretical analysis of South Africa’s peace diplomacy. 
 
5.2 South Africa’s Foreign Policy under Mandela 
When the democratic government took office, Mandela became a foreign relations tool 
for Pretoria (Vale & Taylor, 1999). The world became fascinated by a man who, after a 
27-year imprisonment, came out to preach peace and forgiveness (Southall, 2006).  
Hughes notes that both Mbeki and Mandela became foreign policy presidents for 
different reasons. “By force of personality, history, reputation and the symbolism of his 
struggle, peacemaking and national-building achievements, Nelson Mandela was feted 
by the international community and de facto became South Africa’s foreign policy 
image.” (Hughes, 2004). 
 
South Africa became personified in Mandela and everything happened when or if he 
became involved. Among many such examples, was when South Africa used Mandela 
in the Cape Town Olympic bid, which the country, unfortunately, did not win (Vale and 
Taylor, 1999). However, Mandela became part of the team which went to Switzerland 





Mandela entered the international stage as an unrivalled icon and South Africa’s image 
was equated with the president’s profile. But Vale and Taylor believed there was limit 
even for a statesman with a standing such as that of Mandela (Vale and Taylor, 1999). 
As South Africa has been thriving over the years, the post-apartheid government’s 
history shows that Pretoria cannot rely forever on what became known as the Madiba 
magic (Alden & le Pere, 2004). Zondi states that the image Pretoria built through the 
iconic platform of Mandela and a lauded political transition helped create a positive 
public perception of South Africa abroad. However, Pretoria is no novice in international 
affairs, anymore. Its standing puts it in the company of older southern powers such as 
Brazil and India, (cited in Christie, 2011). South Africa is no longer regarded as a 
symbol of global righteousness, a status it enjoyed in Mandela years (Olivier, 2006). 
Cilliers also cautions Pretoria about relying on the prestige that came with the country’s 
peaceful transition in 1994 which was led by Mandela: “Reputation, even that of 
someone like President Mandela, is a declining asset that is dependent upon renewal 
for its continued relevance” (Cilliers, 1999). 
 
So conspicuous was Mandela in the international relations that he dominated every 
major foreign policy decision. “During the Mandela years, South Africa resembled an 
overburdened state trying to come to terms with the fragile world order. By virtue of its 
‘miraculous’ transition, the international community expected South Africa to ‘punch 
above its weight’, a view that South African officials tended to encourage” (Alden & Le 
Pere, 2004).  
 
After his inauguration, Mandela had said South Africa would engage the world with a 
principled and highly moral foreign policy (Spector, 2013). But before he took office, 
Mandela outlined the country’s foreign policy objective in 1993. They include that: 
* Issues of human rights are central to international relations and an understanding that 
they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental; 
* That just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through 





* Considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations 
between nations; 
* Peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, 
internationally agreed and non-violent mechanisms, including effective arms control 
regimes, must be employed; 
* The concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign 
policy choices; 
* Economic development depends on growing regional and international economic co-
operation in an interdependent world (ANC, 1993).  
 
It is these principles which led to the belief that Mandela’s foreign policy was idealistic 
(Youla, 2009). Pointing out a contradiction in Mandela’s policy, Youla quotes an author 
who questioned South Africa’s first democratically elected president’s policy of idealism, 
saying: “President Nelson Mandela held publicly that countries with a record of human 
rights violations had been accepted by the UN, Commonwealth and Non-Aligned 
Movement. ‘Why would we let ourselves depart from what international organisations 
are doing?’ Mandela asked.” This realistic view of the world where trade and investment 
took precedence came as a surprise from a man whose foreign policy had always been 
driven by idealistic principles (cited in Youla, 2009).  
 
Responding to critics of Mandela’s foreign policy, Nzimande stated that the ANC had an 
open international relations approach which promoted human rights, democracy and 
peace (cited Youla, 2009). (As mentioned in Chapter 1, Pretoria’s foreign policy is 
based on the governing party’s foreign relations objectives). Youla concluded that 
analysts who viewed Mandela’s foreign policy as following the idealistic approach were 
mistaken. Their assumption was simplistic for what was a much complex and 
contradictory foreign policy (Youla, 2009). 
 
Every post-apartheid president has added his personal touch to Pretoria’s foreign 






goals, which he had helped formulate (McNeil, 1997), government officials also became 
used to his spontaneity when he conducted foreign relations. Evans, then Department 
of Foreign Affairs director-general, adapted to Mandela’s style of engagement in the 
international stage as he said then: “He (Mandela) is a major actor in foreign policy. I’m 
never surprised by anything Mr Mandela does” (cited in McNeil, 1997).  
 
The South African president’s behaviour as a foreign relations actor also depended on 
who he engaged with. When he tried to persuade Zambia’s president Frederick Chiluba 
to delay polls and allow former president Kenneth Kaunda to contest elections, the 
Zambian president quietly ignored him. Mandela left the matter (McNeil, 1997). 
 
The presidency of the democratic government’s first head of state was never going to 
be easy, given the amount of work that was needed to undo the damage caused by 
apartheid. Ryall captured Mandela’s challenge as foreign relations actor aptly when he 
said that the eccentric nature of his interventions into foreign policy and the pre-
occupations of domestic reconstruction meant that Pretoria could not offer a viable 
vision of its role within southern Africa (Ryall, 1997). 
 
Mandela’s peace diplomacy started in 1994 when he attempted to end a civil war in 
Angola (Landsberg, 2006). Among many peace diplomacy initiatives that Mandela will 
be remembered for is his call for punishment of Abacha’s government, (Barber, 2005), 
(Hamill and Lee, 2001) and (Vickers, 2002). The Nigerian government had executed 
Ogoni activists after a controversial trial (Flood, 2013).  
 
The democratic government’s first president called for punishment for Abacha’s regime. 
Although the Commonwealth had suspended Abacha’s regime, Mandela sought more 
retribution for the Nigerian government. He called for the West to shun Nigeria’s oil and 
appealed to African governments to put pressure on Nigeria. Mandela’s call yielded no 
consequences; instead African nations accused Pretoria of crossing the line (Flood, 





Analysts’ views differ on what the above illustrated about Mandela as an international 
relations actor in the continent. Olivier opines that the campaign against Nigeria showed 
that Mandela never shied away from playing a decisive role in denouncing or acting 
against injustices or human rights abuses in other countries. He did this without fear to 
be condemned for interfering in the affairs of other states. This was associated with the 
fact that Mandela had spent almost three decades in prison after fighting against the 
abuse of human rights which had brought humiliation to the black population (Olivier, 
2006). But Vale and Taylor point out that the Nigeria crisis showed that although the 
South African icon commanded international respect, not everyone bowed to Pretoria’s 
desires (Vale and Taylor, 1999). 
 
Another crisis in which Mandela intervened was the contentious issue of the Lockerbie 
deadlock between Libya and the United States of America. Muammar Gaddafi’s 
government had been at loggerheads with the United States of America and United 
Kingdom over claims that Gaddafi was hiding the alleged bombers of Pan Am Flight 103 
in 1988 where many American and UK passengers perished. Mandela managed to 
convince Gaddafi to send the suspects to stand trial in Scotland where the crime took 
place (Hamill and Lee, 2001).  
 
According to Burton’s Human Needs Theory (which is one of the principal theories 
guiding this study), the conflict resolution process must recognise and legitimise the 
needs of all parties in the conflict. The needs of one party should not be taken care of at 
the expense of the needs of the other party. This will ensure that a win-win situation is 
achieved (cited in Cunning, 2008). The Lockerbie breakthrough confirmed Burton’s 
theory. 
 
The breakthrough is also one of the evidences that showed that South Africa was 
pursuing a mature policy. This intervention demonstrated that Pretoria had diplomatic 
resources which could help yield positive results in one of long-running stalemates 






achievement improved South Africa’s status as a mediator and Mandela saw what 
South Africa had done in brokering the deal as very important for his country (Hamill 
and Lee, 2001) and (Kim, 2013). 
 
Elsewhere Mandela recorded many successes. His credentials as peacemaker are 
unparalleled. Sudan, Congo, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Sri Lanka are some of the countries in 
which Mandela’s government intervened to bring peace (Vale and Taylor, 1999), and 
(Adebajo, 2012).  
 
Hamill and Lee add that Mandela overshadowed the then-Department of Foreign Affairs 
because his unpredictable foreign policy engagements overlooked national interest 
(Hamill and Lee, 2001). Mandela also took advantage of minister Alfred Nzo’s poor 
performance in his portfolio. And because Nzo’s deputy, Aziz Pahad, was a junior 
minister, Mandela used the opportunity to inject his personalised “freelance diplomacy” 
(Vale and Taylor, 1999). Another example of Mandela’s haphazard behaviour in 
executing foreign policy interventions was his unilateral decision to cancel Namibia’s 
debts to South Africa (Hughes, 2004). 
 
Several times Mandela also showed the West that he was no pushover in matters of 
foreign relations. The West had criticised Mandela for his close ties with Gaddafi whose 
government was accused of human rights abuses. “The founder of modern South Africa 
had been under intense Western pressure to shun the troublesome Libyan ruler who 
Ronald Reagan called a ‘mad dog’. But Mr Mandela would not acquiesce. ‘Those who 
feel irritated by our friendship with President Gaddafi can go jump in the pool,’ Mandela 
said.” Shunning Tripoli would have meant that South Africa was unfaithful to an ally who 
was loyal when the ANC, together with other political organisations, fought the minority 
regime. Libya had assisted the ANC financially and many other ways (Kim, 2013). 
 
As he was about to leave office, Mandela declared: “It was pure expediency (on the part 






who had assisted us in obtaining democracy. No one can deny that the friendship and 
trust between South Africa and Libya played a significant part in arriving at this solution” 
(Kim, 2013). 
 
Olivier described Mandela’s foreign policy theme as “South Africa first”. The author 
argued that this theme was expected because South Africa was emerging from the long 
brutal war against minority white domination. Under Mandela it was a case of foreign 
policy begins at home (Olivier, 2006). 
 
5.3 South African Foreign Policy under Mbeki 
While both Mandela and Mbeki have been described as foreign policy presidents 
(Hughes, 2009), Adebajo and Mills also add that Mbeki earned the title because of his 
passion for international relations which he nurtured while still in exile (Mills, 2008) and 
(Adebajo, 2012). Mbeki had been the head of the ANC’s Department of International 
Affairs until 1994 (Pfister, 2000). 
 
Observers agree that Mbeki’s influence on Pretoria’s international relations was second 
to none. Hughes notes that while Mandela’s foreign policy appeared to be opportunistic, 
Mbeki became the root and branch of foreign policy (Hughes, 2004) while Pillay asserts 
that Mbeki is regarded as the father of South Africa’s foreign policy (Pillay, 2011). He is 
a foreign relations man and there is no doubt that Pretoria’s foreign policy under Mbeki 
will be remembered for a long time (Magadla, 2011). 
 
Hughes points out that what sets Mbeki’s presidency apart from Mandela’s is the 
institutionalised vision for the foreign policy (Hughes, 2004). “Mbeki would be 
remembered for his realistic foreign policy orientation, introducing the ideas of socio-
economic transformation at home and in international relations and elevating the 






On the other hand, Pillay adds that it was Mbeki’s passion for international prestige that 
drove him to take a realistic approach towards his foreign policy (Pillay, 2011). 
 
Most people, his admirers and detractors alike, in South Africa, agree that Mbeki 
excelled in the area of diplomacy during his years in the public service. Others are bold 
enough to place him in the all-time international diplomatic elite of Lord Castlereigh, 
Prince Metternich, Prince Talleyrand, Otto von Bismarck, General Marshal, Andrei 
Gromyko, Dag Haamerskjoldt, Henry Kissinger, Le Duc Tho, Chou En-Lai, Peres de 
Cuellar and Boutros Ghali (Mogotsi, 2012). 
 
But Adebajo compares Mbeki to one of Africa’s giants, Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s 
legendary founding leader. The author states that both believed in Africa’s ancient 
prestige and sought to build modern states that re-established the continent’s past. Both 
were renaissance men: imaginative intellectuals committed to a pan-African vision. Both 
were active in the founding of the OAU (Nkrumah) and the AU (Mbeki). While Nkrumah 
promoted the “African Personality”, Mbeki spearheaded the “African Renaissance”. 
“Both were accused of monarchical tendencies at home, and in the end were toppled in 
apparent acts of regicide: Nkrumah in a coup by the military while Mbeki was ‘recalled’ 
by the ANC” (Adebajo, 2012). 
 
Between the middle of the 1980s until the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, Mbeki, with 
ANC president Oliver Tambo, became without question the face of the ANC’s 
international diplomatic work in exile. ANC literature confirms that, indeed, Mbeki’s 
contribution to the ANC’s diplomacy for freedom against the apartheid regime before 
1990 has made him one of Africa’s diplomatic and intellectual colossi of his generation 
(Mogotsi, 2012). Sidiropoulos applauds Mbeki’s government for its commitment to 
bringing peace in many African countries. Although many of the peace missions have 
been costly exercises, Sidiropoulos argues that without South Africa’s efforts, conflict 






Before Mbeki became president in 1999, he had been already influential in foreign 
relations. Mbeki strengthened his foreign relations position by surrounding himself with 
officials whom he trusted to promote his policy agenda. And one of them was 
Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs during his 
presidency. Mbeki’s election as president put him and his trusted lieutenants in control 
of policy making (Van Nieuwkerk, 1993).  
 
Mandela’s successor had reflected on the weakness in Pretoria’s foreign policy. “Thabo 
Mbeki, recognised that the contradictions in policy and implementation were too 
debilitating to be allowed to dominate South Africa’s conduct of international relations.” 
Under Mbeki the foreign policy was revamped so that it became consistent (Alden and 
Le Pere, 2004).  
 
He launched a new integrated planning framework to drive the strategic national 
priorities which included developing and promoting an agenda for the South, an 
equitable global system and national interest (Alden and Le Pere cited in Youla, 2009) 
and (Van Wyk, 2012). 
 
The impetus of his diplomacy was to make foreign policy more strategic (Accord, 2014) 
and (Landsberg, 2012b). “Most importantly, foreign policy in Mbeki’s government 
reaffirmed South Africa’s new status in international politics and articulated the identity 
of the country. President Mbeki gave South African foreign policy a different face by 
introducing a stronger ideological element” (Olivier, 2006). 
 
Mbeki sought to create a distinctive identity, mission and position for Pretoria as a 
foreign relations actor. His foreign policy was bold, signalling and exploiting the 
influence of Pretoria’s new prestige in world politics, its economic and political authority 
in the African continent, its newly attained legitimacy and stature in the developing 
world, its prestigious status as a partner with the powers of the world and its esteemed 






His goal was to make South Africa a respected state in the continent. He wanted 
Pretoria to become a reliable international player pursuing a predictable foreign policy in 
a bid to formulate a progressive agenda (Landsberg, 2012b). 
 
Olivier states that Mbeki lacked the iconic reputation of his predecessor, Mandela. But 
the democratic government’s second president compensated by using his experience 
as a diplomat, negotiator and skilled technocrat. He steered a foreign policy which was 
obvious and a rational choice for a nation in South Africa’s position which aimed to lead 
Africa’s renewal (Olivier, 2006).  
 
As far as international relations was concerned, Nathan sees Mbeki as both an 
ideologue and a realist, with his approach based on three paradigms: democratic, 
Africanist and anti-imperialist. Mbeki’s Africanist perspective – spanning politics, social 
relations, culture and history – borrowed from Black Consciousness Movement leader 
Steve Biko’s thinking. Mbeki like Mandela also slammed military governments and 
leaders who enriched themselves by stealing from their states, something, Nathan 
notes, was almost unheard of in the continent (Nathan, 2005). 
 
Olivier outlines three notable policy shifts that took place under Mbeki’s presidency: the 
Third World, with strong leanings to Africa, became central in South Africa’s foreign 
policy. While Mbeki’s predecessor initiated this policy approach, Mbeki gave it a 
significant boost and engaged with developed nations through the G8 on issues of 
upliftment in Africa (Olivier, 2006). 
 
South Africa chose to forge closer ties with Africa and other nations of the developing 
world. Mbeki changed the priorities of Pretoria’s foreign policy; relations with Africa were 
placed at the top of the ANC government’s policy agenda. This did not mean that 
relations with the West were relegated to the bottom of the foreign policy ladder but they 
were no longer placed at the top of the agenda as was the case pre-1994 elections 






For instance Cuba and Zimbabwe became closer partners with South Africa than the 
United States of America or Belgium. This ignored the reality that South Africa 
depended more on Western nations for trade ties, job creation, investments and new 
technology. Although Pretoria’s foreign policy agenda in a way pushed the developed 
world to a second fiddle status, the West sought to stay engaged with Africa, particularly 
in areas of global security and the fight against international terrorism. The West saw 
Mbeki as a significant leader and partner in the fight against the ills such as poverty and 
underdevelopment in Africa. The South African president became the point man on 
issues of social ills that affected the continent (Olivier, 2006). 
 
There was also a shift in the moral dimension of South Africa’s foreign policy, one of the 
pillars of the Pretoria’s foreign policy objectives which Mandela’s foreign policy was 
centred on. While Mbeki promoted the principle verbally, his actions spoke a different 
language. To him ultimate goals, objectives and strategy were more important than 
morality (Olivier, 2006). He demonstrated this shift by his unwillingness to criticise 
dictatorship and human rights abuses committed by his African counterparts because 
such a move would damage African brotherliness, consensus and co-operation 
(Nathan, 2005).  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Mbeki’s strategic focus on Africa bore a number of 
initiatives (Nepad, APRM, among others) which he hoped would bring about the 
continent’s revival. Barber points out that Mbeki was optimistic about his vision for 
Africa, quoting him as saying, it “will prosper and confound its critics” (Barber, 2005). 
 
Mbeki’s search for Africa’s renewal saw him launch the African Renaissance, which he 
first spoke about in 1998 (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). While many at home were impressed 
by the vision, others pointed out that it lacked heft and was deeply rooted in sentiment 
(Vale & Maseko, 1998). Mbeki’s famous speech “I am an African” linked South Africa’s 
destiny and development to the continent. Mbeki described the African Renaissance as 






development and promotion of democracy in Africa (Mandela, 1993) and (Kooiman, 
2010). This call for unified action seemed to close the gap between Pretoria and the rest 
of the continent (Bischoff, 2003). 
 
Through the African Renaissance, Mbeki sought to encourage Africans to assert 
themselves after years of slavery and colonialism which had diluted their cultures and 
subjected their institutions to foreign rule (Adebajo, 2012). Mbeki’s peace diplomacy 
was also rooted in the “African solutions to Africa’s problems” mantra, which falls within 
the context of the African Renaissance (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013). 
 
However, the continent was not too enthusiastic about the African Renaissance. 
Reasons for this were that it was the first historical overarching pan-African idiom since 
Nkrumah’s; many politicians and other elites saw Mbeki as a novice who had not 
earned his stripes as an African leader; and many did not see the African Renaissance 
succeeding in the long run (Alden & Le Pere, 2006).  
 
Some saw it as South Africa’s subtle attempt to assume a hegemonic role in the 
continent. They thought it was a mild way of showing the continent that South Africa will 
drive Africa’s renewal.  
 
Others thought it as a vision with idealistic, intellectual undertones far removed from 
Africa’s realities of ills such as poverty, conflict and underdevelopment (Alden & Le 
Pere, 2006).  
 
Mandela’s successor had said just before he took office: “The African Renaissance 
demands that we purge ourselves of the parasites and maintain a permanent vigilance 
against the danger of the entrenchment in African society of this rapacious stratum with 
its social morality according to which everything in society must be organised materially 






Mbeki’s foreign policy received a lot of criticism over the years. For instance, Mangcu 
accused Mandela’s successor of running foreign policy as if it was his personal project. 
Mangcu opined that it became difficult to see the country’s strategic priorities and the 
president’s personal idiosyncrasies because of the way Mbeki engaged in foreign 
relations. The analyst quoted Olivier as saying Mbeki’s activities on the global stage 
became part of an effort to become Africa’s uber-diplomat and world statesman 
(Mangcu, 2009). 
 
Mills and Mangcu also accused Mbeki of paranoia over criticism. Mills cautioned that as 
long as the president surrounded himself with people who were always ready to toe his 
line, Pretoria would not improve the lives of ordinary South Africans through foreign 
policy (Mangcu, 2009) and (Mills, 2008). Hlongwane concurred as he said: “He (Mbeki) 
surrounded himself with “yes men”. Under him, criticism no longer became the lifeblood 
of the movement. Instead, selfish political patronage, nepotism and favouritism 
flourished” (Hlongwane, 2010).  
 
Mbeki is one post-apartheid president who came to office with a well-thought-out foreign 
policy vision. He might have become too dedicated to some of his foreign policy 
programmes he implemented, but there is no doubt that he was passionate about South 
Africa’s international relations. Mbeki might have come across as a statesman who 
wanted to tackle many foreign policy initiatives (for Pretoria, Africa and the world) at the 
same time, but there is no evidence that he did all this for his personal glory. His 
mission was to put South Africa on the international relations map. 
 
As Mbeki’s international clout continued to grow, so was discontent over his presidency. 
Many South Africans, especially within the Tripartite Alliance, saw the president as aloof 
and someone who took little care for aspirations of the ordinary South Africans (Robins, 
2012). Magadla suggests that the urgency to save the continent and South Africa at the 






While Mbeki’s foreign policy was more coherent than Mandela’s, there was 
disconnection in Mbeki’s global objectives – “reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
deepening regional integration, the revival of Africa, a better deal for the global South in 
world affairs – and the normative basis from whence he conducts his crusade” (Alden & 
le Pere, 2004).  
 
In effect foreign policy making became centralised in the office of the president where a 
Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Service was established. One of its five chief 
directorates was responsible for International Relations, Peace and Security (Hudson, 
2010). This centralisation made foreign policy even more inaccessible to the ordinary 
South Africans and strengthened the view that Mbeki’s government was aloof and 
unresponsive (Suttner cited in Hudson). 
 
5.4 South African Foreign Policy under Zuma 
When Zuma took office, many foreign relations observers expected a shift from Mbeki’s 
foreign policy. The ruling party had promised to transform South Africa’s international 
relations agenda (Landsberg, 2012a). But from the start, there was evidence that Zuma 
continued to place significant emphasis on South Africa’s role in Africa, and was as 
enthusiastic as Mbeki in pursuing this objective (Brueton, 2010). 
 
While Zuma’s reputation differs from Mbeki’s and Mandela’s, he has been more of a 
foreign policy president than many commentators thought (Pretoria News, 2014).  
This is partly because when Zuma became president, he brought in a wealth of 
experience in peace diplomacy since he was already an accomplished negotiator 
(Shillinger, 2009).  
 
Indeed, Zuma got international experience and exposure in exile. But he seems to also 
have focused on the domestic policy as he negotiates his space in the international 






Although Fabricius agrees that Zuma’s foreign policy is a continuity of Mbeki’s, he notes 
that Zuma government has new priorities. Fabricius states that this was seen in the 
department’s name change from Foreign Affairs to International Relations & 
Cooperation, the marrying of the foreign policy with the domestic policy and a 
strengthening of relations with the nations in the region and the rest of the continent 
rather than making partnerships with the whole world, something Mbeki became famous 
for (cited in Gruzd, 2009). 
 
Even the foreign policy pillars of the Zuma government are the same as those of his 
predecessor. They include: aligning the domestic policy and foreign policy or national 
interest. This would ensure that while South Africa engages with the outside world, its 
engagements do not conflict with the domestic policy and Pretoria gets a maximum 
benefit from its engagements with other nations and international organisations 
(Landsberg, 2012a). 
 
While South Africa has been working within the SADC since 1994, evidence shows that 
there is still a lot of work that still needs to be done, especially in its security organ. 
Promoting Southern African Development Community integration is one of Zuma 
administration’s pillars (Landsberg, 2012a). 
 
The advancement of the African continent has been very important in South Africa’s 
foreign policy, which it has promoted through programmes such as Nepad (Landsberg, 
2012a). 
While Habib states that Zuma’s government has attempted to compensate for the 
neglect of rights promotion that happened during Mbeki’s government (Habib, 2012), 
the Democratic Alliance lambasts Zuma’s government for not doing enough to promote 
human rights and for not having clearly defined national interest. These issues have 
resulted in embarrassing gaffes in the international stage and the reversal of 





Zuma’s government has only dropped the term quiet diplomacy for the policy on 
Zimbabwe. The peace diplomacy adopted by Zuma is continuation of what Mbeki 
started in that country (Landsberg, 2012a). And Zuma has been using non-
confrontational and accommodative solutions to intervene in conflicts in the continent, 
since he took office just as Mbeki did during his mediation in South Africa’s northern 
neighbour (Government Information System, 2009). 
Some analysts have also described Zuma as a hands-off president, allowing his 
lieutenants to execute his foreign policy agenda (Mangcu, 2009). Zuma’s approach is 
different from Mbeki’s, who devoted a lot of his time to mediate peace in Zimbabwe 
(Miti, 2013). Zuma appointed Lindiwe Zulu, Mac Maharaj and Charles Nqakula to 
mediate in Zimbabwe. Nqakula had already been leading the Zimbabwe peace mission 
from the time Mbeki was recalled (Gruzd, 2009). 
As a result of his hands-off approach, the South African president received a tongue 
lashing from Mugabe for not personally facilitating mediation in Zimbabwe. The 
Zimbabwean president accused Zuma of letting his advisers take charge of the peace 
diplomacy in his country (Graeme & Ndaba, 2013). This came after Zulu suggested that 
Zimbabwe should postpone the 2013 elections. An angry Mugabe told Zuma to rein in 
his adviser (Sibanda & Matenga, 2013). 
 
However, many commentators agree that Zuma has allowed participation of those 
outside the government in international relations, something that never happened during 
Mbeki’s presidency. Wheeler commends the International Relations Department for 
allowing space for business, academia, labour and ordinary citizens. He states that this 
was unheard of during Mbeki’s government (Wheeler, 2011). “There is a noticeable shift 
in style. Zuma’s affable, easy-going nature has served him well on the global stage thus 
far. While not being the master of the sound bite, (neither was Mbeki), he has appeared 






But other observers describe Zuma’s foreign relations as feeble. Shaw suggests that 
one of the reasons for weak priorities in Zuma’s foreign policy is the fact that the 
president has other priorities such as addressing domestic challenges, which include 
unemployment, poverty and others (Shaw, 1994). Zuma’s presidency has to address 
internal issues such as an increasingly violent public sector, clashes in the Tripartite 
Alliance and the impact of the financial crisis which began in 2008 (Pringle, 2010). 
Giving the nod to Shaw’s assertion, Makekeng quotes Zuma as saying Pretoria does 
not overlook the importance of shared values and common interests in implementing its 
foreign policy, also arguing that the securing of its national interests is important for the 
country’s development (Makekeng, 2010).  
 
National interest areas include speeding up economic growth and creation of decent 
work; the building of economic and social infrastructure; rural development strategy that 
will promote land reform and food security; focusing on human resources and 
strengthening skills; improving health in the country; eradicating crime and corruption, 
building cohesive and caring communities; fostering regionalism, continental and 
international co-operation, sustainable resource management and use; and the 
improvement of service delivery (Makekeng, 2010). 
 
5.5 Changes in South African Foreign Policy after 1994 
One of the significant changes in South Africa’s relations after 1994 was that nations 
around the world welcomed South Africa and began forming relations with the new 
democracy (Mkalipi, 2002) and (Black & Swutuk, 1997). Barber notes that the post-
apartheid democracy also enjoyed an “enthusiastic welcome” from international 
organisations most of which had contributed to the struggle against apartheid (Barber, 
2005). 
 
There was eagerness to assist a nation that had been ravaged by years of apartheid 






Pretoria was too wealthy to qualify for development aid, children’s rights organisation, 
Unicef, made an exception: it allocated $20 million to Pretoria (Barber, 2005). Youla and 
Spector agree that post-1994 South Africa’s advantage was the fact that it enjoyed the 
recognition of the international community (Youla, 2009) and (Spector, 2013).  
 
Olivier notes that over the years, South Africa’s foreign policy has followed a realistic 
approach which is tinged with ideological tendencies that sometimes stand in the way of 
real interest, especially those of the economic sphere (Olivier, 2006). But Valji and Tladi 
add that Pretoria’s foreign policy at best can be seen as treading a thin line between the 
expectation that the country should be a leader in promoting human rights and the 
unavoidable realpolitik of working in a changing geo-landscape where power alliances 
are taking new shape (Tladi & Valji, 2013). 
 
But the post-1994 South African foreign policy has also assumed a schizophrenic 
character. On the one hand some analysts heap praise on the democratic government 
for the strides it has made in international relations while others criticise Pretoria for its 
inability to formulate a coherent foreign policy agenda (Hamill & Lee, 2001). Pretoria’s 
foreign policy’s schizophrenic character is seen in the way it is playing a leadership role 
in the continent and wooing others to join in fulfilling its vision. On the other hand it is 
forced by the realistic factors to become an equal partner in the region (Habib & 
Selinyane, 2006). The view of Vale and Taylor of South Africa’s foreign policy is that it 
portrays a dual picture – that of being “something special” and “just another country”. 
The authors opine that that is why many analysts are fascinated by Pretoria’s foreign 
policy (Vale & Taylor, 1999).  
 
Even before the ANC government took office, the country’s foreign policy was a 
contested territory within the Tripartite Alliance (Evans, 1999). Realists believed South 
Africa’s foreign policy should prioritise relations with northern America and Europe while 
idealists and socialists demanded that the policy must be ethical, Afrocentric and 






adhere to the values and objectives in line with its own history of the struggle (Bischoff, 
2003). Perhaps, that is why Hamill and Lee and Evans state that Pretoria’s foreign 
policy is characterised by pull-and-push effect (Hamill & Lee, 2001) and (Evans, 1999). 
 
One of the commitments the democratic government made when it took office was to 
become a good international citizen (Hamill & Lee, 2001), (Marthoz, 2012) and 
(Landsberg, 2005). But the reality is that the ANC’s idealistic and the realistic leanings 
of the globalised world brought about tensions in the implementation of the foreign 
policy, (Alden & Le Pere, 2004) and (Ryall, 1997). To appreciate Pretoria’s foreign 
policy, one needs to realise that it was a product of the ANC consensus-based politics 
and, therefore, had many compromises and contradictions, especially on how to 
balance values with interests (cited in Cawthra, 2011).  
 
5.6 Pretoria’s Peace Diplomacy in the Past 20 Years 
The literature consulted for this study leaves no doubt that South Africa has worked 
hard to strengthen its peace diplomacy over the years. As early as in the Mandela 
presidency, South Africa was chastised for its peace diplomacy in countries such as 
Nigeria and Lesotho. But Pretoria has also won accolades from the international 
community for the role it has played in bringing peace in the continent which borrowed 
from the country’s own historical negotiations which ended apartheid in 1994 (Malan, 
1999) and (Pillai, 2009). 
 
Criticising South Africa for blunders it made during the early years of the democratic 
government is unfair. The ANC government was still learning the ropes of governing the 
country at this time. Mandela acknowledged that reality when he said: “We were taken 
from the bush, or from the underground or from prison, to come and take charge. We 
were suddenly (thrust) into this immense responsibility or running a highly developed 
country” (sic) (cited in Barber, 2005). Pretoria’s engagements in different peace 






government has responded in ways it thought were best for each mission. So it is fair to 
say that Pretoria’s foreign policy practice is a work in progress. 
 
As much as politicians such as Mbeki had been involved in international relations while 
in exile, they were not in government at the time. The brand of foreign relations they 
engaged in was largely that of campaigning for support to fight apartheid at home.  
 
When Mbeki became president, he was heavily criticised for his peace diplomacy in 
Zimbabwe. Literature shows clearly why the democratic government’s second president 
chose quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe. He was pre-occupied with keeping the African 
unity when he started peace diplomacy in Zimbabwe and wanted to avoid another 
Nigeria fiasco, among other reasons. In other words he wanted to show Africa that 
South Africa was not going to interfere in another country’s internal affairs. 
 
Not every policy decision presidents take will be popular with all observers. But that 
does not mean that the policy is weak or wrong. Pretoria supported SADC’s idea of 
letting Zimbabwe, as a sovereign state, devise its own peace plan that its leaders and 
people would own. Mbeki showed his critics that he would not be swayed by public 
opinion on how to conduct peace mediation in that country, as long as he was 
convinced that his policy would yield results.  
 
The Department of Foreign Affairs sees South Africa’s advancement of peace and 
security as its priority for its African Agenda goal in addition to promoting democracy 
and human rights and pursuing development and poverty eradication (cited in 
Kagwanja, 2006). Pretoria’s distinctive approach for peace mediation is to uphold 
democracy by mediating between warring parties. Frequently the peace model includes 
an interim government that involves the warring parties, confidence-building exercises 
and the overhaul of the inclusive army, provisions to address justice issues, provisions 






But Curtis argues that in promoting democracy in the continent, Pretoria tends to 
perceive conflict resolution as a narrow frame of reference of South Africa’s “negotiated 
revolution”. For instance, it fails to consider key political economic factors of the Great 
Lakes region (Curtis, 2007). Claphman also adds that the down side of this model is 
that it assumes that the warring parties in the peace process share similar value 
frameworks, within which differences are negotiable (cited in Curtis, 2007).  
 
Carothers rejects the idea that nations will democratise with the help of external 
mediations without dealing with underlying political history, institutional legacies, ethnic 
make-up, socio-cultural traditions or other “structural” features (Carothers, 2000).  
 
An important tool for South Africa’s peace diplomacy is peacekeeping. In fulfilling its 
commitment to building peace on the African continent, Pretoria has deployed 
peacekeeping troops into many of Africa’s most protracted conflicts (Dunderdale, 2013). 
Dunderdale argues that South Africa remains one of the more attractive options for 
leading peacekeeping operations. Its thriving experience accumulated from previous 
missions has helped Pretoria to become a leader in peacekeeping (Dunderdale, 2013).  
 
The above shows that South Africa has imported its brand of peace model to other parts 
of the continent. This could be partly because Pretoria is still trying hard convince its 
counterparts that it has no ambitions of bullying Africa. By offering warring nations its 
peace model, which paved the way for its democracy, Pretoria is showing other nations 
that if it worked for South Africa, it can work for other African countries. However, this 
has failed in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire and that shows that this diplomacy tool is 
not always as effective as Pretoria would like to believe. 
 
Brooks commends the SANDF for launching Operation Blue Crane, which drew 4700 
members from the SADC in 2000, after recognising the need for investing in training 
peacekeepers (Brooks, 1999). The author suggests that it was important for Pretoria to 






of the internal transformation challenges the South African army was facing (Brooks, 
1999). This allowed Pretoria to put its house in order before it expanded its peace 
diplomacy in the continent. It was important for the democratic government to grow 
gradually as a peacemaker in the African continent.  
 
Paterson and Virk also point out that because of Pretoria’s prominence in African and 
global diplomacy, institutional capacity limitations have resulted in “diplomatic 
overstretch”. As a result, South Africa’s engagement with the continent can often seem 
poorly co-ordinated (Paterson & Virk, 2014). Cilliers concurs as he states that lack of 
funding, transformation which bedevils discipline – and operational capacity – limits 
Pretoria’s potential to live up to the expectation of leading peacekeeping in Africa (cited 
in IRIN, 2012). 
 
South Africa will set it itself up for failure if it continues to overstretch itself in the area of 
peace diplomacy. This is something it should avoid since it is still trying to convince the 
African continent that it is a trustworthy peacemaker.  
 
5.7 Challenges Facing Pretoria’s Peace Diplomacy 
South Africa’s peace diplomacy in the African continent does not look like it is going to 
slow down in the near future. As a well-resourced nation, South Africa is still going to 
support many peace mediation missions in Africa. 
 
Promoting peace in the continent is expected to require more resources, therefore, call 
for larger investment from countries like South Africa. The reason for this is that violent 
conflicts remain a problem throughout Africa and show no signs of decreasing. For the 
imaginable future, intrastate conflicts are likely to continue in poor countries with weak 
governance, history of war, spillover from bad neighbourhoods and growing youth 
joblessness and marginalisation. The combination of these prospects will, in all 
likelihood, lead to longer, more lingering conflicts, which will consequently inflate the 





South Africa needs to strengthen its peace diplomacy so as to keep up with the work it 
is expected to do in the future. This will ensure that the peace diplomacy work it has and 
is continuing to do in the African continent is not reversed. 
 
Other challenges that pose a threat to Pretoria’s contributions include dealing with ill-
behaved members of the army who tarnish the image of the Pretoria’s peacekeeping 
record (Lotze, De Coning, & Neethling, 2013). In Burundi and the DRC, for instance, 
South African peacekeepers were found guilty of more than 1000 cases of misconduct 
between 2002 and 2006. More than half of these violations involved absence without 
leave, disobeying lawful commands and drunkenness (Lotze, De Coning, & Neethling, 
2013). 
 
Reports of shameful behavior undermine Pretoria’s record of peace diplomacy and this 
is something Pretoria cannot allow to continue. Ill-disciplined army members are ruining 
the sterling peacekeeping work that Pretoria has done in the past 20 years and South 
Africa cannot afford to have its reputation tarnished by such soldiers. 
 
Another problem is the prevalence of Aids among members of the SANDF. In 2004, the 
SANDF’s official figure for HIV/Aids-infected soldiers stood at 23%, but Aids specialists 
said a more realistic figure would be 40%, or about 28000, infected army members 
(Meyer, 2004). Having such a huge number of ill soldiers will impact on Pretoria’s ability 
to deploy peacekeepers. 
 
South Africa’s political readiness to deploy its army into complex operating 
environments, such as the DRC, should line up with resourcing considerations for the 
SANDF. Adjusting this inconsistency will ensure that the SANDF has the operational 
capability to act competently in peacekeeping missions in which they engage (Lotze, De 






In 2011, the presidency announced that the Department of International Relations & 
Cooperation was engaged in talks with the AU on funding Pretoria’s contribution to the 
Sudanese peace mission. Pretoria acknowledged that while it was committed to 
peacekeeping in the continent, it was unable to fund some of the missions because of a 
budgetary shortfall (South African Government News Agency, 2011). 
 
South Africa should face the reality that it cannot carry the large part of the load of 
bringing peace in the continent. As much as peace diplomacy is important, Pretoria has 
other budgetary needs to attend to.  
 
5.8 Theoretical Analysis 
A well-researched political inquiry is based on an accurate theoretical framework. This 
study aimed to investigate Pretoria’s peace diplomacy from 1994 to 2014 guided by 
international relations theories of realism or idealism, and conflict resolution and 
peacekeeping theories. Thus this study has discussed various aspects of Pretoria’s 
peace diplomacy in the past 20 years. This section analyses a few example to show 
how South Africa has endeavoured to resolve conflicts and how Mandela, Mbeki and 
Zuma have guided peace diplomacy in the continent. The aim of this part of the study is 
to show how Pretoria has played its significant role in peace diplomacy in the continent 
and that Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma did not strictly follow one particular ideology as 
international relations actors. 
 
The number of Illegal immigrants has grown significantly in South Africa. Among them 
are tens of thousands of Zimbabweans who have fled their country because of the 
political crisis that was at its worst in the early 2000. From the realism view point, 
Mbeki’s government failed to use its powerful position in the region to demand that its 
neighbour sorts out its political crisis so that the migration would stop (Youla, 2009). 
 
This study has shown that from the time Mbeki engaged in the Zimbabwean peace 





should defend the interest of state outside its borders. States are not equal; the power 
of states determines how important each is in the global stage. The investigation of the 
Zimbabwe’s crisis shows that Pretoria refrained from using this power. National security 
is also important to realists; that is why they see the state as the protector of the territory 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2003). 
 
Therefore, the above shows that Mbeki did not always act as a realist. According to the 
realist grasp of foreign policy, a state will protect, promote and maximise its perceived 
core interests in its interactions with other countries, the international community or 
other foreign relations actors. An examination of Mbeki’s policy of quiet diplomacy 
towards Zimbabwe also showed that his approach on Zimbabwe was that of persuasion 
rather than the practice of power (Youla, 2009). 
 
Olivier also agrees with Youla that Mbeki dabbled between idealism and realism. He 
states that the reasons Mbeki straddled between these theories could indicate two 
realities: an indecisive style of leadership and or the characteristically complex nature of 
the politically balancing act when engaging in African politics (Olivier, 2003). 
 
The same behavior of bestriding between idealism and realism was seen in Mandela. 
The Nigeria campaign against the Abacha regime confirmed the idealism the 
democratic South Africa’s first president adopted in the early years of his presidency 
(Firsing, 2013). It is also in line with the country’s foreign policy objectives of promoting 
peace and human rights. However, Mandela’s refusal to condemn leaders such as 
Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Gaddafi went against idealist beliefs he was known for. The 
two leaders’ regimes were accused of human rights abuses (Vickers, 2002). Again the 
above proves that although Mandela’s foreign policy embraced idealism, he sometimes 
acted as a realist. 
 
Many observers agree that Zuma’s foreign policy has continued with what Mbeki started 






violations, although some observers say Zuma has attempted to compensate for the 
neglect of rights promotion that happened during Mbeki’s government. Like Mbeki, 
Zuma has condoned the behaviour of dictators. Mbeki played a significant role in 
shifting South Africa from Mandela’s liberal to a liberationist direction, a foreign policy 
path that continues under Zuma (Jordaan, 2010).  
 
John Burton’s Human Needs Theory neatly describes South Africa’s peace bid in the 
Sudan war. The needs theory asserts that people resort to conflict because of their 
need for consistency, security, recognition, justice and a sense of control and 
development (Cunningham, 1998). Sudan’s war, which began in 1955, resulted from the 
Southerners’ complaints about lack of opportunities to accumulate wealth, demand for 
southern autonomy and the role of religion in the state (Project, 2014). Southerners 
protested that Khartoum enforced an Arab identity and broke a promise to institute a 
federalist system of government (Lucey & Hendricks , 2013). Pretoria was instrumental 
in the ratification of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that resulted in a ceasefire in 
2005. Key conditions in the deal related to regional autonomy for southern Sudan, 
representation in a national power-sharing agreement and a referendum in the south in 
2011 (Mashele, 2012). 
 
Lyman asserts that without the hard work of the Africa Union High Level Implementation 
Panel, under the leadership of Mbeki, South Sudan would not have seceded as 
smoothly as it did in 2011 and that there would not be ways of negotiating the 
outstanding issues between Khartoum and the Southerners (Lyman, 2012). The 
Sudan/South Sudan breakthrough was testimony to Burton’s assertion that conflict can 
end only when people’s needs are met. The autonomy enabled Southerners to take 
control of their affairs and gain recognition as a nation. Although the two nations found a 
breakthrough which led to the birth of South Sudan, fighting over the ownership of oil 







This chapter started by analysing South Africa’s foreign policy under the guard of 
Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. It examined how South Africa’s foreign relations has 
evolved since 1994, also revealing how South Africa has attempted to influence foreign 
relations internationally. 
 
For instance this section discussed how Mandela used his reputation in the fight against 
human rights abuses and attempted to broker peace in Africa. Although diplomacy 
attempts backfired in the Nigeria episode, the democratic government’s first president 
showed the world Pretoria’s stand on issues it cared about. This section also revealed 
how Zuma’s foreign policy has continued on Mbeki’s approach of engaging with the 
world, especially Africa, and how, unlike Mbeki, Zuma left most of the mediation in 
Zimbabwe to his lieutenants. 
 
This chapter also revealed the challenges that have impacted on Pretoria’s foreign 
relations since the advent of democracy. It revealed how Pretoria has meandered peace 
diplomacy while also dealing with its own challenges within the South African National 








This study set out to investigate Pretoria’s conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the 
continent since the birth of democracy in 1994. When the ANC government took office, 
it specifically aimed to strengthen its relations with the rest of the continent, particularly 
southern Africa. It was determined to play a positive role as a contributor to peace 
diplomacy in Africa.  
 
South Africa has used multilateralism as a tool to engage in peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution because of scepticism, among other reasons, about its engagements in 
peace diplomacy. Pretoria has worked through regional and international bodies in its 
attempt to play its role as a peacemaker. As a result the post-apartheid government was 
instrumental in creating the AU and has played a significant role in the SADC and other 
bodies. In boosting reforms in these organisations, Pretoria aimed to encourage African 
governments to work towards bringing African solutions to Africa’s problems. 
 
Mbeki has been lauded for strengthening South Africa’s peace diplomacy in the 
continent. His peace diplomacy became deeply imbedded in the African Agenda notion 
that Pretoria will not meddle in the affairs of its neighbours. Mbeki’s government aimed 
to inject these changes through the birth of the African Renaissance, the grand 
programme for Africa’s renewal. The renaissance gave birth to Nepad, an economic 
vehicle through which Africa’s rebirth would be realised and the APRM became an 
instrument which aimed to ensure good governance among African governments. While 
these programmes have received mixed reviews, they have also been lauded for their 
innovative role in the renewal of the African continent. 
 
South Africa has taken part in many peace missions in the continent. While it has been 
accused of crossing the line in countries such as Nigeria and Lesotho, it has been 






Many observers still argue that South Africa’s peace diplomacy has not yielded results 
in Zimbabwe. But this study proved that Pretoria’s peace mission in its neighbour 
delivered the SADC mandate to find a breakthrough in its northern neighbour’s political 
crisis. The Pretoria-led peace mission produced a new constitution and also resulted in 
elections in 2013. 
 
After years of mediation in Burundi, South Africa’s mediation helped end a conflict which 
had claimed thousands of innocent lives. South Africa’s mediation helped Burundians 
establish a transitional government and 50/50 reform of the military. This came after the 
mediation produced the Arusha Accord for Peace and Reconciliation which set Burundi 
on a journey towards constitutional democracy and protection of human rights. 
 
South Africa’s peace mission in Cote d’Ivoire showed shortcomings. Mbeki and Zuma 
insisted on backing the resolution of government of national unity after the 2010 election 
stalemate. However, this went against the election results. Ivorians had spoken through 
the vote by electing Ouattara. Suggesting any other way of governing Cote d’Ivoire 
meant undermining the will of the people.  
 
This study also showed that in its rush to find a resolution in a conflict situation, South 
Africa mainly uses its power-sharing model as the solution for solving political crisis in 
the continent. There are many reasons for this rush; one of them is that South Africa 
often invests millions of rands in these peace missions. That means the longer they 
continue, the more Pretoria has to pay to help bring peace in nations facing conflicts.  
 
Burton’s Human Needs Theory is one of the theories which guided this study. It asserts 
that people resort to conflict when their needs, such as security, development and 
identity are not met. Conflicts that South Africa has intervened in Burundi, Zimbabwe, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan/South Sudan have erupted because some of the above needs 
were ignored. This study used the example of the Sudan conflict to show how South 






It is, however, vital to note that, one of the needs of South Sudan people – development 
– has not been met. That is why fighting for oil resources is still continuing in those two 
countries. South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and Mbeki are still involved 
in mediation in the Sudan/South Sudan conflicts, the former as a South African special 
envoy to South Sudan and the latter as the AU chief mediator (Fabricius, 2014) and 
(Tekle, 2014). 
 
Analysts have associated Pretoria with a number of international relations ideologies. 
However, this study proved that South Africa’s principal foreign relations actors did not 
follow one ideology.  
 
This study also showed how Mandela chastised those who dared to accuse him of 
continuing friendship with leaders of authoritative regimes. He showed that he was not 
willing to cut ties with leaders he regarded as friends just because the West had 
different opinions about those presidents. This did not only suggest that Mandela was 
not prepared to succumb to the pressure from his critics who attempted to impose their 
opinions on South Africa’s international relations, it showed that South Africa wanted to 
exercise its freedom of choosing who it forged relations with. This research also showed 
that Mbeki also did not always act as a realist, although he was perceived as one. His 
persuasive approach towards Zimbabwe departed from realism which was associated 
with his government.  
 
The above proves that classifying the South African presidents as either idealist or 
realist was not an accurate analysis. Realities of foreign relations forced them to dabble 
between these theoretical constructs. They might have sometimes shown leanings 
towards one particular theory, but that did not mean that events that they responded to 
required them to stick to one particular construct. 
 
Mbeki and Zuma have been accused of replacing Mandela’s liberal values with 






largely put moral consideration at the top of its foreign policy agenda, the world saw 
self-interest thrive during the Mbeki and Zuma governments. After Mandela’s 
government, South Africa started to support dictators who violated democratic 
principles.  
 
The above assertion proves that South Africa’s behaviour as a mediator in the continent 
sometimes has shown contradictions. But blaming South Africa for a haphazard foreign 
policy behaviour would be unfair. Critics should remember that the foreign relations field 
is constantly evolving like many other fields and foreign relations actors should learn to 
adapt to those changes.  
 
Having said all the above, this study has proved that despite all the challenges Pretoria 
has faced, it has made strides in peace diplomacy in the continent. South Africa has 
invested millions of rands in its bid to meet the expectations of the international 
community which has encouraged Pretoria to play a meaningful role in leading the 
Africa’s renewal. 
 
In this analysis, we have seen how Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma have contributed in 
helping South Africa make its mark in the international relations stage in peace 
diplomacy. Because of the complexity of the real world, they have adapted their policies 
to meet foreign relations needs.  
 
6.2 Recommendations 
South Africa has faced criticism for selling the power-sharing model to other parts of 
Africa. As much as this model has helped countries such as Burundi and the DRC, it is 
also true that not all disputes can be solved this way. Foreign policy actors should now 
consider revising the country’s peace mediation model so that Pretoria will come up with 
other options which will offer solutions in a wide range of conflict situations. History 






Sometimes robust action, or, at least, the warning of it, must be applied to resist threats 
to democracy and constitutional order. 
 
This study has shown that there are many factors which trigger conflicts around the 
continent. For instance, although conflicts in Zimbabwe and Burundi were both civil 
clashes, they were each characterised by different dynamics. One of the main obstacles 
in the Burundi conflict was the involvement of neighbouring government which 
supported some rebel groups. The situation in Zimbabwe was different in the sense that 
the clashes were between groups within the country, the ruling party and the opposition 
party, which split eventually.  
 
Zuma recognised that the situation in the Burundi conflict needed special attention, thus 
he responded correctly by involving the AU and UN in the mediation of peace in that 
country. Although Pretoria used the same peace model in both countries, the Burundi 
and Zimbabwe conflicts show that mediators should not devise a one-size-fits-all peace 
model because there are many dynamics to consider in every conflict.  
 
South Africa has resisted hegemonic ambitions since the inception of the democratic 
government. This is one of the ways it has attempted to distance itself from the hostile 
behaviour of the apartheid government towards Africa. But literature shows that in some 
cases, South Africa fails to take the lead in peace diplomacy because it hides behind 
the excuse of non-interference. This undoubtedly hampers the way it works as a peace 
mediator.  
 
South Africa has relied on quiet diplomacy in some of conflict resolution operations it 
has engaged in. This often prolongs the process of resolving a conflict, therefore, use 
up a lot more state resources than necessary in some cases. Sometimes decisive 
actions must be used to bring completion to the peace process. Not all conflicts should 






engage in the peace process sometimes apply delaying tactics for different reasons. 
South Africa should assess each peace mission regularly to evaluate its effectiveness to 
ensure that peace missions do not take longer than they should. 
 
Pretoria has invested a lot of resources in peace diplomacy in the continent, a gesture 
which is commendable. However, this study has also shown that with dwindling 
finances, South Africa has overstretched itself in the area of funding peace missions. 
Pretoria should continue to encourage, through the AU, African nations to contribute to 
financing peace missions in the continent.  
 
The South African army is an integral part of South Africa’s peacekeeping. This study 
showed that over the years, South African peacekeepers have been found guilty of acts 
of ill-discipline in some of the countries in which they have been deployed. This 
research also showed that Aids has also hampered South Africa’s peacekeeping. 
Pretoria needs to consider applying a stringent policy on who should be deployed in 
peacekeeping. Soldiers with bad records should be automatically excluded from 
participating in peace missions. Incidents of ill-discipline among members of the army 
happen in other nations around the world and many of those nations deal with rebellious 
members decisively. Applying strict rules for the SANDF will save South Africa from 
making embarrassing headlines. 
 
Attending to these challenges will go a long way to improve peacekeeping in the 
continent and ensure that Pretoria is a reliable partner in bringing peace in Africa. That 
will enable South Africa to lead a peace diplomacy that is maturing, something which 
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